



# EVALUATION

Programme-based Support through  
Finnish Civil Society Organizations I



Evaluation on Finland's Development Policy and Cooperation

**2016/4a**



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# EVALUATION

## EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAMME-BASED SUPPORT THROUGH FINNISH CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS I

### Crisis Management Initiative

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**2016/4a**

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# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PRIO	Peace Research Institute of Oslo
RBM	Results-Based Management
UN	United Nations
UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs





# TIIVISTELMÄ

Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) -järjestön kehitysyhteistyöohjelman 2010-2015 evaluointi on yksi kuudesta ensiksi evaluoidusta suomalaisesta kansalaisjärjestöstä, jotka ovat saaneet monivuotista ohjelmatukea. Evaluoinnin tarkoituksena on tuoda esille näyttöön perustuvaa tietoa sekä opastusta siihen, miten 1) parantaa tulosperustaista johtamista kansalaisjärjestöille annettavassa ohjelmatuessa ja 2) edistää kansalaisyhteiskunnalle annettavalla tuella saavutettuja tuloksia.

CMI:n kokonaisstrategia on luoda kaikki osapuolet mukaanottavia rauhanprosesseja ja käyttää uusia taitoja ja analyyskejä. CMI:llä on hyvät suhteet korkean tason päättäjiin sekä vahva uskottavuus sovitteluprosesseissa ja vuoropuheluissa. Viimeisten kolmen vuoden aikana, jolloin CMI on saanut ohjelmaperustaista tukea, on se noin seitsemän miljoonan euron vuosibudjetillaan pystynyt toimimaan tehokkaasti tukiessaan hyvin hajautetulla tavalla avaintoimijoita noin kolmellatoista eri alueella ympäri maailmaa. Nykyisen kehitysyhteistyössä vallitsevan tulosperustaisen johtamisjärjestelmän mukainen seuranta ja evaluointi, samoin kuin tulosten havaitseminen, on kuitenkin äärimmäisen haastavaa.

Aiottujen ja todellisten tulosten analysointi paljastaa myös sen, että CMI on pystynyt tehokkaasti hyödyntämään niin odottamattomia muutoksia kuin aikaisempia saavutuksiaankin. Tässä evaluoinnissa tuli esille se, miten hyvin CMI pystyy luomaan uusia kontakteja rauhanprosessin kriittisillä hetkillä, ja se, että Afrikan unionin korkean tason henkilökunta käyttää saamiaan uusia taitoja rauhanneuvotteluissa Afrikassa. CMI:n koordinointi ja viestintä ovat hyvällä tasolla. Rauhanvälittämisen epävirallinen ja usein luottamuksellinenkin luonne edellyttää, että suurta osaa CMI:n työhön liittyvästä informaatiosta ei välttämättä voida jakaa laajalle yleisölle.

Järjestö yrittää aktiivisesti monipuolistaa rahoituspohjaansa, mutta se saattaa vaarantaa nykyisen matalan profiilin ja ketterän toimintatavan säilymisen. CMI:llä on kuitenkin hyvät lähtökohdat löytää tapoja, joiden avulla se voisi käyttää yksityistä pääomaa.

**Avainsanat:** CMI, konfliktien sovittelu, seuranta ja evaluointi, Suomen kansainvälinen asema

# REFERAT

Utvärderingen av Crisis Management Initiative (CMI:s) utvecklingssamarbetsprogram 2010-2015 är en av de första sex utvärderingarna av finska civilsamhällsorganisationer (CSO) som får flerårigt programbaserat stöd. Syftet med utvärderingen är att ge evidensbaserad information och vägledning för att 1) förbättra resultatstyrning av det programbaserade stödet till det civila samhället och 2) att öka resultaten från det finska stödet till det civila samhället.

CMI:s övergripande strategi är att öka delaktighet i fredsprocesser, och att lyfta fram ny kompetens och nya analyser. CMI har mycket god tillgång till beslutsfattare på hög nivå och en stark trovärdighet vad gäller medling och dialog. Dess årliga budget på cirka 7 miljoner euro över de senaste tre åren (då det trädde in i partnerskapsavtalet med Utrikesministeriet) har gjort det möjligt för organisationen att arbeta effektivt och decentraliserat med stöd från nyckelaktörer från 13 olika områden runt om i världen. Uppföljning och utvärdering och att spåra prestanda är dock extremt utmanande på basen av de resultatstyrningssystem (RBM) som dominerar inom utvecklingsbiståndet.

En analys av de planerade och uppnådda resultaten avslöjar också att CMI lyckats utnyttja oförutsedda förändringar och använda de prestanda som den uppnått tidigare med goda resultat. Denna utvärdering har även kunnat observera hur CMI skapat nya kontakter i avgörande stunder av fredsprocesser, samt att högre tjänstemän inom den Afrikanska Unionen tillämpat nya färdigheter i fredsförhandlingar i Afrika. Nivån på CMI:s samordning och kommunikation är god. Den informella och ofta konfidentiella karaktären av fredsförmedling innebär dock att information angående en stor del av CMI:s arbete inte nödvändigtvis kan delas i stor utstäckning.

Organisationen försöker aktivt diversifiera sin finansiering, men detta riskerar att skapa utmaningar för dess låga profil och mycket smidiga arbetssätt. CMI är dock i en bra position för att utforska hur privat kapital kan utnyttjas.

*Nyckelord: CMI, konfliktmedling, uppföljning och utvärdering, Finland internationella position*

# ABSTRACT

The evaluation of the development cooperation programme of Crisis Management Initiative 2010-2015 is one of the first six evaluations on Finnish Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) receiving multiannual programme-based support. The purpose of the evaluation is to provide evidence-based information and guidance on how to 1) improve the results-based management approach of the programme-based support to Civil Society, and 2) enhance the achievement of results from Finnish support to civil society.

CMI's overall strategy is to increase inclusiveness in peace processes, and bring new skills and analysis to bear. CMI enjoys very good access to high level decision makers, and a strong credibility in relation to mediation and dialogue. Its budget of approximately €7million per year over the past three years (when it entered the programme-based support) has enabled it to operate effectively in a very decentralised manner in support of key actors in some 13 different areas of the world. M&E and the tracking of performance is however extremely challenging against the background of existing results-based management systems which prevail in development aid.

An analysis of the intended and actual outcomes reveals also that CMI has been able to take advantage of unforeseen changes, and used the achievements it had generated in the past to good effect. This evaluation was able to observe the way in which CMI creates new contacts at critical moments of peace processes, and that senior personnel of the African Union are applying new skills to peace negotiations in Africa. The level of CMI's coordination and communication is good. The informal and often confidential nature of peace brokering requires that for much of CMI's work information cannot necessarily be shared widely.

The organisation is actively seeking to diversify its funding, but this risks creating challenges to its low profile and very agile mode of operation. It is however in a good position to explore the ways in which private capital could be put to use.

*Keywords: CMI, conflict mediation, monitoring and evaluation, Finland's international position*

# YHTEENVETO

## Johdanto

Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) -järjestön kehitysyhteistyöohjelman evaluointi on yksi kuudesta ensiksi evaluoidusta kansalaisjärjestöstä, jotka ovat saaneet monivuotista ohjelmataukea. Evaluoinnin tarkoituksena on tuoda esille näyttöön perustuvaa tietoa sekä opastusta siihen, miten 1) parantaa tulosperustaista johtamista kansalaisjärjestöille annettavassa ohjelmatuessa ja 2) edistää kansalaisyhteiskunnalle annettavalla tuella saavutettuja tuloksia.

Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) -järjestön evaluoinnin teki kaksi konsulttia kolmessa eri vaiheessa joulukuun 2015 ja kesäkuun 2016 välisenä aikana. Evaluoinnin aloitusvaiheessa luotiin yhteinen ymmärrys viiden muun evaluoitavan kansalaisjärjestön kanssa kunkin tavoitteista sekä saavutusten näytöstä. Sitten oli vuorossa tietojen keruuvaihe Helsingissä, Moldovassa ja Brysselissä, minkä jälkeen seurasivat raportointi, evaluoinnin synteessin laatiminen ja tulosten jakaminen.

## Tausta ja metodit

CMI on itsenäinen suomalainen järjestö, joka on perustettu vuonna 2000 laajenuksena rauhannobelistin Suomen entisen presidentin Martti Ahtisaaren henkilökohtaiselle toimistolle. Toimistot toimivat vieläkin yhdessä samoissa tiloissa. CMI on Suomessa rekisteröity järjestö, jolla on omat jäsenet, säännöt sekä vuosikokoukset, joissa työsuunnitelmat, talousarviot ja raportit hyväksytään. Järjestö saa mandaattinsa presidentti Ahtisaaren henkilökohtaiselta toimistolta, joka on aikaansaanut lukuisia konfliktinratkaisuja. Nämä puolestaan ovat tuoneet mukanaan lisää asiantuntemusta ja kontakteja. CMI on kasvanut nopeasti vuodesta 2010 lähtien ja tullut mukaan ulkoasiainministeriön kumppanuusohjelmaan vuonna 2014. Tällä hetkellä CMI toimii noin 13 alueella eri puolilla maailmaa ja sillä on seitsemän miljoonan euron vuosibudjetti sekä 65 työntekijää. CMI kutsuu itseään Suomen rauhanvälittäjäksi.

Evaluointiraportissa esitetty näyttö perustuu pääosin kahteen tapaustutkimukseen. Ensimmäinen niistä on itsensä itsenäiseksi julistaneen Transnistrian ja Moldovan välisille konfliktineuvotteluille annettu tuki. Toinen tapaus on hanke, jossa vahvistetaan naisten kapasiteettia osallistua rauhanneuvotteluprosesseihin, erityisesti Afrikassa. Tapaustutkimusmenetelmää käytettiin analysoitaessa toiminnan aiottuja ja tahattomia vaikutuksia, erityisesti suhteessa niiden kontekstiin. Tapaukset valittiin huolellisesti kuvastamaan Suomen kehitysyhteistyölinjauksen prioriteetteja, meneillään olevia neuvotteluja sekä prosesseja, joissa evaluointi ei häiritsisi rauhanprosessia.

## Tarkoituksenmukaisuus

CMI:n kokonaisstrategia on luoda kaikki osapuolet mukaanottavia rauhanprosesseja ja käyttää uusia taitoja ja analyysejä. CMI:llä on hyvät suhteet kor-

kean tason päättäjiin sekä vahva uskottavuus sovitteluprosesseissa ja vuoropuheluissa. Eri sidosryhmät hyväksyvät CMI:n roolin. Sen työntekijöitä ja yhteistyökumppaneita käytetään aktiivisesti rauhantyyntön suunnitteluun sekä toteuttamiseen.

CMI:n ohjelmien pääkohderyhmä on keski- ja ylätasoin päättäjät, mutta ohjelmat vastaavat hyvin myös heikompien kohderyhmien tarpeisiin - olivatpa nämä sitten syrjäytettyjä johtajistoryhmiä tai erityisesti naisia konfliktien ratkaisutilanteissa. CMI edistää kaikki osapuolet mukaan ottavia rauhanprosesseja tarjoamalla niin työkalut kuin fooruminkin ja painottamalla poliittisesti laajojen ratkaisujen arvoa.

## **Tehokkuus**

CMI on kehittänyt vahvat järjestelmät sekä riskien että talouden hallintaan perustuen erittäin pätevin johtotiimin vahvuuksiin. Järjestelmissä painotetaan vahvasti kulujen hallintaa sekä innovatiivisuutta sovittelutoimien suunnittelussa, seurannassa ja evaluoinnissa.

Nykyisen kehitysyhteistyössä vallitsevan tulosperustaisen johtamisjärjestelmän mukainen seuranta ja evaluointi, samoin kuin tulosten havaitseminen, on kuitenkin äärimmäisen haastavaa. Luonnollisesti sovittelutyön pitää olla luottamuksellista, jotta se ei heikentäisi niiden asemaa, joita järjestö pyrkii auttamaan. CMI:n hankkeet ovat tyypillisesti erittäin monitahoisia ja niissä on useita tuntemattomia, odottamattomia sekä läpileikkaavia tekijöitä, jotka edellyttävät hyvää joustavuutta ja kykyä tarttua tilaisuuteen. Oletus suorista syy-seuraussuhteista, jotka on huolellisesti suunniteltu ja tulosindikaattoreilla ilmaistu, ei yksinkertaisesti päde epävakaisissa konfliktitilanteissa.

CMI on tunnistanut tarpeen muokata seuranta- ja evaluointijärjestelmää ja onkin kehittänyt täsmällisempiä tulosten raportointitapoja menettämättä kuitenkaan joustavuuttaan toimijana. Vuonna 2015 järjestölle ilmoitettiin ulko-ministeriöltä saatavan rahoituksen leikkaamisesta 38 prosentilla. Se johti vaikeaan uudelleenorganisointivaiheeseen ja haasteisiin sopeuttaa suunnittelu-, seuranta- ja evaluointityötä sen mukaisesti, taustalla vielä hyvin nopeasti muuttuvat tilanteet alueilla kuten Jemen ja Libya. Järjestö ei ole pystynyt täysin vastaamaan näihin haasteisiin tiimien sisäisessä työnjaossa. Lisäksi järjestön alemmilla tasoilla on ollut sekaannusta taloudellisen ja teknisen hallinnon välillä.

## **Tuloksellisuus**

Nopea muutos ei kuitenkaan ole vaikuttanut CMI:n tulosten saavuttamiseen. Aiottujen ja todellisten tulosten analysointi paljastaa myös sen, että CMI on pystynyt tehokkaasti hyödyntämään niin odottamattomia muutoksia kuin aikaisempia saavutuksiaankin. Tämä pätee erityisesti Moldovaan, missä uusi kansainvälinen sovitteluryhmä pystyy tukeutumaan CMI:n kokoaman epävirallisen asiantuntijaryhmän kapasiteettiin.

Hankkeilla on merkittävä kyky ymmärtää haasteita ja rajoituksia sekä vastata niihin. Hajautettu päätösten teko sekä verkostorakenne ovat sidosryhmien mukaan järjestön vahvuuksia. CMI:tä on kiitetty sekä sisältöasioiden tuntemuksesta ja odottamattomien kontaktien avautumisesta että kyvystä

antaa rauhanprosesseille pitkäaikaista ja suhteellisen määrittelemätöntä tukea. Järjestö nähdään myös kykeneväisenä antamaan kenttätason tukea oikea-aikaisesti.

### **Vaikutus**

Rauhanrakentamisen evaluoinnin paradoksi on minkä tahansa pitkäaikaisen, indikaattoreihin pohjautuvan ja ennustettavan vaikutuksen kiistanalaisuus. Tämä vaatii evaluointia, joka perustuu tiettyihin toimintatapoihin, ja pääsyä tietoihin, jotka voivat olla arkaluontoisia raportoiviksi. CMI:n seuranta- ja evaluointijärjestelmä ei ole vielä pystynyt vastaamaan tähän haasteeseen, mikä tarkoittaa että sen aikaansaamia vaikutuksia luonnehtivat lähinnä hyvämaineisten ja korkean tason sidosryhmien kiittävät lausunnot todennetun näytön sijaan.

Tämä evaluointi on kuitenkin havainnut, miten CMI:n kyky luoda uusia kontakteja kansainvälisessä yhteistyössä Euroopan turvallisuus- ja yhteistyöjärjestön OSCE:n epävirallisessa dialogiryhmässä, johon kuuluvat myös Venäjä ja Saksa, on mahdollistanut järjestön neuvottelijoiden pääsyn asiantuntijaelimiin, jotka ovat avainasemassa ratkottaessa Moldovan konfliktin perimmäisiä kysymyksiä. CMI:n järjestämään sukupuoliseen tasa-arvoon liittyvään koulutukseen osallistuneilta saatu palaute osoittaa, että Afrikan unionin korkean tason henkilöstö käyttää saamiaan uusia taitoja Afrikassa käydyissä neuvotteluissa.

### **Kestävyys**

CMI:n työ on useimmiten kytketty ryhmiin ja instituutioihin, jotka soveltuvat hyvin kuhunkin rauhanprosessiin. Ne saattavat olla kansalaisjärjestöjä, epävirallisia ryhmiä tai monenkeskisiä instituutioita. Hankkeet keskittyvät kuitenkin enemmän yksittäisiin henkilöihin, heidän asiantuntijuuteensa sekä yhteyksiinsä eikä niinkään heidän taustajärjestöihinsä. CMI:n tavoitteena on vaikuttaa rauhanprosessien vuoropuheluun, jolloin järjestön kapasiteetin kasvattaminen on vain keino päästä tähän päämäärään.

Saavutettujen tulosten kestävyys riippuu hyvin paljon rauhanprosessista itsestään. CMI pyrkii kuitenkin tarkoituksellisesti myös kehittämään työvälineitä sekä tietoa, jota myös muut osapuolet voivat hyödyntää. CMI on kokeuksiansa sekä analyttisten työkalujensa kautta kehittänyt tietotaitoa, jota muut usein kopioivat. Tätä prosessia voidaan kutsua kestävyden saavuttamiseksi epäsuoralla tavalla.

Rahoitusleikkausten tuomat haasteet vaikuttavat merkittävästi CMI:n tulevaisuuden suunnitelmiin. Se on luonnollisesti kiinnostunut yksityissektorin rahoituksesta, sillä sovittelukentällä toimivat kahden- ja monenkeskiset lahjoittajat ovat usein määrällisempiä kuin Suomen ulkoasiainministeriö. Yksityissektorin rahoituksen saaminen on vielä aivan alkuasteella.

### **Täydentävyys ja koordinointi**

CMI:n koordinointi ja viestintä on hyvällä tasolla. Rauhanvälittämisen epävirallinen ja usein luottamuksellinenkin luonne edellyttää, että suurta osaa CMI:n työhön liittyvästä informaatiosta ei välttämättä voida jakaa laajalle yleisölle. Evaluoinnissa ei kuitenkaan löydetty näyttöä siitä, että CMI ei olisi infor-

moinut työstään asianmukaisia osapuolia, olivatpa ne henkilöitä tai järjestöjä. Valtapolitiikan yhteydessä saattaa silti ilmaantua valituksia.

CMI:llä, kuten muutamilla muillakin suomalaisilla kansalaisjärjestöillä, on ainutlaatuinen rooli Suomen ulkopoliitikassa sekä maan julkisen kuvan luomisessa. Käsitys Suomesta rakentavana, kestäväenä sekä matalan profiilin yhteistyökumppanina palvelee CMI:n julkista kuvaa ja CMI käyttää tätä käsitystä hyväkseen.

## Päätelmät ja suositukset

CMI:lla on ainutlaatuinen profiili. Sen haasteina ovat nykyinen riippuvuus julkisesta rahoituksesta sekä kyvyttömyys tiedottaa järjestön tekemän työn vaikutuksista yksinkertaisella ja todennettavalla tavalla. Nykyinen asiantila ei estä järjestöä tekemästä laadukasta työtä, mutta CMI:n pitää varoa ottamasta vastaan liikaa toimeksiantoja, mikä saattaa vaikuttaa sen elinkykyisyyteen pitkällä aikavälillä. On välttämätöntä ymmärtää ja selittää enemmän, millälaisia vaikutuksia CMI:n toiminnalla on, ja lisätä sen rahoituksen kestävyyttä. Suhteessaan Suomen ulkoministeriöön CMI:n on säilytettävä oman työnsä itsenäisyys ja monipuolisuus tavoilla, jotka eivät sulje pois tilivelvollisuutta.

Evaluointi esittää seitsemän yksityiskohtaista suositusta, joita kehitellään edelleen päätöskappaleessa kahdella laajalla aihealueella. Ensimmäinen liittyy CMI:n suunnittelu-, seuranta- ja evaluointijärjestelmien kehittämiseen niin, että ne soveltuvat paremmin työn luonteeseen. Toinen aihealue liittyy tapoihin käyttää yksityistä pääomaa CMI:n tavoitteiden edistämiseen, sillä julkisen rahoituksen leikkaukset saattavat vaarantaa järjestön itsenäistä toimintaa. Evaluointi kehottaa Suomen ulkoministeriötä ymmärtämään CMI:n tuottama lisäarvo ja säilyttämään sen nykyinen, järjestön itsenäisyyttä kunnioittava suhde antamalla sille perusrahoitusta.

1. CMI:n toiminta-alue kansainvälisten normien ja työvälineiden sekä erikoispiirteitä omaavien paikallisten konfliktien välissä olisi säilytettävä. Ulkoministeriön ohjelmatuki on tässä mielessä tärkeä osa järjestön toimintakykyä. CMI:n suhteellinen itsemääräämisoikeus ja luottamus sen kykyyn suunnitella hankkeita pitäisi säilyttää.
2. Henkilöstön osaaminen ja toimenkuvat olisi sovitettava yhteen ja olisi löydettävä keinot varmistaa, että jotkut hankkeiden yhteyshenkilöistä olisivat valtuutettuja hallinnoimaan resursseja kun taas toiset suuntautuisivat ulospäin konfliktitilanteiden käsittelyyn.
3. CMI:n tämänhetkistä pyrkimystä keskittyä enemmän kontekstiin seuranta- ja evaluointijärjestelmässä pitäisi jatkaa. Lisäksi pitäisi painottaa muutuskertoimia<sup>1</sup> sekä tapaa, jolla erityishankkeet liittyvät kontekstikertoihin, joihin voidaan vaikuttaa.

<sup>1</sup> CMI ehdottaa käytettäväksi tätä termiä osana tulevaa muutosteoriaansa, joka tarkoittaa tekijöitä, jotka lisäävät muutoksen todennäköisyyttä, tai kriittisiä tilanteita joissa käytetään vallitsevaa vaikutuksen astetta annetussa rauhanprosessin kontekstissa.

4. CMI:n täytyy säilyttää mukautuva johtamistyyliänsä. Se onnistuu entistä paremmin tekemällä palautesilmukasta entistä järjestelmällisempi ja nopeampi, käyttämällä laadullisempia ja reaaliaikaisempia seurantanäkökulmia ja antamalla tahattomille vaikutuksille niille kuuluva merkitys.
5. CMI:n seuranta- ja evaluointijärjestelmän tulisi olla strategisempaa ja perustua kontekstiin. Tämä voidaan toteuttaa parantamalla muutokset (tai ratkaisevien muutosolosuhteiden tai muutosajureiden) käsitteellistämistä ja tunnistamista, ja ymmärtämällä, miten hankkeet vaikuttavat tai eivät vaikuta näihin muutosajureihin. Kahtiajakoa suunniteltu/suunnittelematon tai aiottu/tahaton tulisi painottaa vähemmän, samoin lopputilanteiden määrittämisestä. Sen sijaan pitäisi korostaa enemmän reaaliaikaista raportointia sekä tiedon tallentamista kontekstista kuten myös sen kehityksen ennakkointia.
6. Järjestön riippumattomuus ja erityispiirteet tulisi säilyttää, mikä ei toteudu automaattisesti kehitysapuinstrumentteja käytettäessä. Järjestön riippumattomuutta ei saisi uhata rahoituksen vähentämisellä. Jatkuvalla julkisille tuelle on olemassa vaihtoehto, sillä UM voi hyödyntää resurssejaan yksityisen pääoman mobilisoimiseen. Investoinnit, joilla on kehitysvaikutusta, tarjoavat merkittäviä mahdollisuuksia.
7. Järjestön tulisi erottaa luottamuksellisuusvaatimukset julkisesta viestinnästä. Seurannan ja evaluoinnin osalta pitäisi tutkia tarkemmin, miten erottaa mutta silti tallentaa arkaluontoisia tietoja, koska tehokkaimmat interventiot löytyvät usein juuri niiden joukosta. Yksi tapa on kehittää pisteytysjärjestelmä, jossa kokonaispisteillä kuvaillaan toteutunut yleiskuva, mutta pisteytyksen tietopohjaan pääsee käsiksi ainoastaan rajoitettu määrä henkilöitä, joilla on valtuutus arvioida raportoinnin tarkkuus.



# SAMMANFATTNING

## Inledning

Utvärderingen av Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) utvecklingsamarbete är en av de första sex utvärderingar av finska civilsamhälleorganisationer (CSO) som mottar flerårigt programbaserat stöd. Syftet med utvärderingen är att ge evidensbaserad information och vägledning för att 1) förbättra resultatbaserad styrning (RBM) av det programbaserade stödet för civilsamhällsorganisationer, och 2) att öka resultaten från finskt stöd till det civila samhället.

Utvärderingen av CMI utfördes av två konsulter i tre faser från december 2015 till juni 2016. Den första fasen, dvs. inledningsfasen, var gemensam med fem andra organisationer och designades med avsikten att skapa en gemensam förståelse av målen i de olika CSO och av vilka bevis som skulle användas för att utvärdera prestanda. Inledningsfasen följdes av en datainsamlingsfas i Helsingfors, Moldavien och Bryssel, vilket ledde till framtagandet av den aktuella rapporten, samt en sammanfattnings- och spridningsfas.

## Bakgrund och metoder

CMI är en oberoende finsk organisation som grundades år 2000 som en förlängning av nobelpristagaren och Finlands tidigare president Martti Ahtisaaris privata kontor. (Kontoren är fortfarande belägna på samma plats och arbetar i tandem). CMI är en registrerad förening i Finland med medlemmar, föreningsregler, årsmöten som godkänner planer, budgetar och rapporter. Dess mandat härrör från Martti Ahtisaaris personliga kontors aktiviteter. Kontoret har genererat ett stort antal aktiviteter för konfliktlösning, som i sin tur har skapat möjligheter när det gäller kompetens och kontakter. Organisationen växte särskilt snabbt från 2010 och gick med i partnerskapsavtalet med utrikesministeriet år 2014. År 2016 är den verksam i omkring tretton områden i världen med en budget på cirka 7 miljoner euro och 65 anställda. CMI definierar sig själv som Finlands fredsmäklare.

De huvudsakliga bevisen som presenteras i denna rapport baserar sig på två fallstudier. Den första fallstudien omfattar stödet till förhandlingarna om konflikten mellan den självutnämnda Dnestriska moldaviska republiken (eller Tansnistrien) och Moldavien. Den andra omfattar kapacitetsutveckling för att stärka kvinnors roll i fredsprocesser, särskilt i Afrika. Fallstudie-metoden användes för att analysera de avsedda och oavsedda effekterna av organisationens aktiviteter, särskilt i relation till de sammanhang där de äger rum. Fallen valdes noggrant för att återspegla den finska regeringens prioriteter, aktuella förhandlingar, samt processer där utvärderingen inte riskerade att skada fredsprocessen.

## Relevans

CMI:s övergripande strategi är att öka delaktighet i fredsprocesser, och att lyfta fram ny kompetens och nya analyser. CMI har mycket god tillgång till

beslutsfattare på hög nivå och en stark trovärdighet vad gäller medling och dialog. Dess uppsökande verksamhet accepteras gärna av externa intressenter och CMI personal eller partners används aktivt i utformandet och genomförandet av fredsaktiviteter.

CMI:s planering fokuserar på beslutsfattare på medel till hög nivå, men planeringen är också mycket lyhörd för svagare intressenters behov - till exempel när det gäller marginaliserade ledningsgrupper, eller närmare bestämt kvinnor, i konfliktlösning. CMI främjar delaktighet genom att tillhandahålla verktyg och arenor för deltagande och betonar värdet av politiskt inkluderande lösningar.

### **Effektivitet**

Organisationen har utvecklat mycket starka riskhanterings- och finansiella system, som bygger på styrkan hos en högt kvalificerad ledningsgrupp. Det finns en stark betoning på kostnadskontroll och en vilja att förnya sig inom området för planering, uppföljning och utvärdering av medlingsverksamheten.

Uppföljning och utvärdering och att spåra prestanda är dock extremt utmanande på basen av de resultatstyrningssystem (RBM) som dominerar inom utvecklingsbiståndet. Medlingsaktiviteter måste - på grund av dess natur - skyddas av sekretess för att inte underminera de organisationer de försöker stödja. Medling kännetecknas också av omfattande komplexitet och innefattar många okända, oförutsedda och genomgående faktorer, vilket kräver att det finns en stark känsla av möjligheter och flexibilitet i projekten. Antagandet att linjära orsakssamband kan planeras noggrant från början och ramas in med indikatorer för prestanda är helt enkelt inte tillämpbart i dessa instabila konfliktsituationer.

CMI erkänner detta behov att anpassa sig och har arbetat på att utveckla mer exakta sätt för resultatrapportering som samtidigt bibehåller dess flexibilitet. År 2015 har organisationen informerats om en 38% minskning av finansiering från UM, vilket har resulterat i en svår omstrukturingsperiod. Detta har kombinerats med utmaningen att justera planerings-, uppföljnings- och utvärderingssystemen, vilket ställs på sin spets under högdynamiska situationer i t.ex. Jemen eller Libyen. Det finns ett visst mått av motsvarande svaghet i arbetsfördelningen inom arbetslagen, och en del förväxling mellan ekonomisk och teknisk förvaltning på lägre nivåer i organisationen.

### **Resurseffektivitet**

Den snabba övergången har dock inte påverkat resultaten som organisationen levererar. En analys av de planerade och uppnådda resultaten visar också att CMI har kunnat dra nytta av oförutsedda förändringar och med gott resultat använda sig av framgångar som genererats tidigare. Detta gäller särskilt i Moldavien, där en ny konstellation av internationell medling kan åberopa resurser från en informell expertgrupp som etablerats av CMI.

Projekten har avsevärd förmåga att förstå och möta utmaningar och begränsningar. Intressenter rapporterar om styrkan som ligger i ett decentraliserat beslutsfattande och en nätverksstruktur inom organisationen. CMI prisas både för dess ämnesexpertis, dess förmåga att öppna upp för kontakter som man inte ens vågat hoppas på, och även dess förmåga att ge långvarigt och rela-

tivt ospecificerat stöd i förhållande till specifika fredsprocesser. Organisationen ses som fullt kapabel att ge stöd på plats och i rätt tid.

### **Effekter på lång sikt**

Paradoxen med att utvärdera fredsbyggande är att all slags bevis på effekter på lång sikt som bygger på indikatorer och planeringsprognoser ofta är mycket ifrågasatta. Utvärderingen måste istället basera sig på särskilda möjligheter för engagemang och kräver tillgång till information som kan vara känslig att rapportera. CMI:s uppföljnings- och utvärderingssystem har ännu inte kunnat åtgärda denna utmaning, vilket innebär att organisationens effekter på lång sikt i stora drag definieras i form av beröm från välrenommerade aktörer på högre nivå, snarare än bevis.

Denna utvärdering har dock kunnat iaktta hur CMI:s förmåga att skapa nya kontakter i det internationella samarbetet inom ramen för OSSE, i en informell dialog-grupp som omfattar Ryssland och Tyskland, har gjort det möjligt att under förhandlingarna få tillgång till expertorgan som varit avgörande för att ta itu med några av de underliggande problemen i Moldavienkonflikten. Återkopplingsformulären från deltagarna i genusutbildningen har även gett bevis på att ledande personal från Afrikanska Unionen tillämpar nya kunskaper under förhandlingarna i Afrika.

### **Hållbarhet**

CMI:s arbete är oftast kopplat till grupper och institutioner som är väl positionerade i en fredsprocess. Dessa är mycket olika och kan vara CSO, informella grupper eller multilaterala institutioner. Relationen är dock avgörande, eftersom organisationerna fokuserar på individer och deras kompetens och relationer, snarare än på själva organisationerna. Slutmålet är att kunna påverka dialogen inom fredsprocessen och den kompetens som utvecklats är bara ett medel till målet.

De uppnådda resultatens hållbarhet är också högst beroende av själva fredsprocessen. CMI försöker dock avsiktligt att utveckla verktyg och kunskap som kan vara till nytta för andra parter. Deras immateriella rättigheter, så som idéer och lärdomar som genereras från egna erfarenheter och analysverktyg, tas ofta upp och replikeras av andra, vilket indirekt bidrar till hållbarhet.

De utmanande finansieringsnedskärningarna intar en betydande plats i CMI:s planering för framtiden. Organisationen dras naturligt till privata medel, eftersom bilaterala och multilaterala givare inom medling, som till exempel finska UM, ofta ger mer styrda direktiv. Denna finansiering från den privata sektorn är fortfarande mycket outvecklad.

### **Komplementaritet och samordning**

Nivån på CMI:s samordning och kommunikation är hög. Den informella och ofta konfidentiella fredsförmedlingen innebär att en stor del av CMI:s arbetsinformation inte nödvändigtvis kan delas i stor utsträckning. Det finns dock inga bevis som pekar mot att CMI har missat att informera relevanta individer eller organisationer, utöver de klagomål som normalt kan uppstå inom sfären för makt och politik.

CMI, liksom vissa andra finska CSO, har en unik roll inom Finlands utrikespolitik och anseende. Själva uppfattningen om Finland som en konstruktiv, bestående och lågprofil partner gagnar CMI, och vice versa.

## Slutsatser och rekommendationer

Utmaningen för en organisation med så unik profil som CMI reflekteras i det nuvarande beroendet av offentliga finansieringskällor och dess oförmåga att förmedla effekter på lång sikt på ett sätt som är både enkelt att uppfatta och möjligt att verifiera. Den nuvarande situationen kommer inte att påverka arbets kvaliteten, men effekterna av överambitiösa åtaganden kräver omsorg, eftersom dessa kan sträcka ut organisationen för långt och därmed inverka även dess initiativs genomförbarhet på lång sikt. Det finns ett behov av att ytterligare förstå och förklara CMI:s långsiktiga effekter och att säkra framtida finansiering. För UM finns det ett behov att bevara arbetets självständighet och mångsidighet på ett sätt som inte underminerar redovisning och ansvar.

Utvärderingen ger sju detaljerade rekommendationer, som ytterligare utvecklas i det avslutande avsnittet runt två breda teman. Ett är att fortsätta att utveckla CMI:s planerings-, uppföljnings- och utvärderingssystem för att bättre passa den typ av arbete som utförs. Det andra är att utveckla användandet av privat kapital för att främja de egna målen, eftersom budgetnedskärningar från offentliga bidragsgivare kan äventyra organisationens oberoende. En underliggande rekommendation till det finska utrikesministeriet är att förstå det värde som genereras av en CSO som CMI, och vikten av att bevara den nuvarande stödjande och mer distanserade relationen genom basfinansiering.

1. Den balansgång mellan internationella normer och instrument å ena sidan och lokala konflikters säregenheter å den andra, som CMI nu lyckas upprätthålla i sitt arbete, bör bevaras. UM:s partnerskapsavtal är i det sammanhanget en viktig del av denna förmåga att anpassa sig och smälta in. Den relativa autonomin och tillit som ges till CMI i utformningen av projekten bör bibehållas.
2. Kompetensmallar och arbetsbeskrivningar för personal bör vara bättre anpassade till varandra och man bör finna metoder för att säkerställa att vissa kontaktpunkter inom projektverksamheten har full befogenhet att hantera resurser, medan andra är mer utåtriktade för att hantera konfliktsituationer.
3. CMI:s arbete att utveckla sitt nuvarande uppföljnings- och utvärderingssystem till att bättre uppmärksamma kontexten bör fortsätta, med särskild tonvikt på ”multiplikatorer”<sup>2</sup> och på hur specifika projekt anknyter till sådana kontext-multiplikatorer som är mottagliga för påverkan.
4. CMI bör bevara sin anpassningsbara förvaltningsstil. Detta skulle kunna göras ännu bättre genom att göra återkoppling ännu mer systematiskt och snabbt med hjälp av mer kvalitativ uppföljning i realtid och genom att ge vederbörlig vikt åt oavsiktliga effekter.

<sup>2</sup> Termen ”multipliers” föreslås av CMI i samband med organisationens ändringsteori (”theory of change”) för att hänvisa till faktorer/drivkrafter som ökar sannolikheten för förändring, eller till kritiska förhållanden som har övervägande inflytande i en fredsprocess.

5. CMI:s uppföljnings- och utvärderingssystem måste vara mer strategiskt och förankrat i sammanhanget. Detta kan göras genom att bättre utveckla konceptualisering och identifiering av multiplikatorer (eller avgörande faktorer, eller drivkrafter) för förändring och genom att förstå hur projekten påverkar, eller inte påverkar, dessa. Dikotomin mellan det planerade/oplanerade eller det avsiktliga/oavsiktliga bör betonas mindre och sluttillstånd bör definieras mindre. Mer tonvikt bör istället ges åt realtidsrapportering och tillvaratagandet av kunskap om kontexten och hur den förutses utvecklas.
6. Organisationens oberoende och särdrag måste bevaras och detta uppstår inte automatiskt om utvecklingsbiståndsinstrument tillämpas. Detta oberoende bör inte hotas av en minskning av medel. Ett alternativ till fortsatt offentlig finansiering är att UM använder sina resurser till att mobilisera privat kapital. Investeringar som görs i syfte att stödja olika former av samhällsförändringar ("impact investment") erbjuder stora möjligheter.
7. Organisationen måste lämna ut sekretessbelagda uppgifter från sin offentliga kommunikation, vilket är fullständigt lämpligt. CMI bör undersöka närmare hur den i sin uppföljning och utvärdering kan separera men fortfarande fånga upp känslig information, eftersom det ofta är där de mest effektiva insatserna ligger. Ett sätt att genomföra detta är att utveckla ett poängsystem där den totala poängen möjliggör en översikt av prestatanda, men där evidensbasen för poängsättningen, även konfidentiell information, endast är tillgänglig för ett begränsat antal personal som anlitas för att bedöma tillförlitligheten och materialiteten i rapporteringen.

# SUMMARY

## Introduction

The evaluation of development cooperation programme of Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) is one of the first six evaluations on Finnish Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) receiving multiannual programme-based support. The purpose of the evaluation is to provide evidence-based information and guidance on how to 1) improve the results-based management approach of the programme-based support to Civil Society, and 2) enhance the achievement of results from Finnish support to civil society.

The evaluation of Crisis Management Initiative CMI was carried out by two consultants from December 2015 to June 2016 in three phases. The Inception Phase was shared with five other organizations and designed to create a common understanding of the aims of the different CSOs and the evidence of performance. It was followed by a Data Collection Phase in Helsinki, Moldova and Brussels, which led to the production of the current report, and a Synthesis and Dissemination phase.

## Background and Methods

The CMI is an independent Finnish organization created in 2000 as an extension of the personal office of Nobel Peace Laureate and former President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari (the offices are still co-located and work in tandem). It is a registered association in Finland. It has members of association, rules, annual meetings that approve plans, budgets and reports. Its mandate is derived from the activities of the personal office, which have created numerous undertakings for conflict resolution. In their turn these undertakings have generated capabilities in terms of expertise and contacts. It grew particularly fast from 2010, and entered the programme-based support Framework Agreement with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2014. By 2016 it operates in some thirteen areas of the world, with a budget of about €7 million, and 65 staff. It defines itself as Finland's peace broker.

Two case studies provide the main body of the evidence presented in the report. The first is the support to the negotiations on the conflict between the self-declared Republic of Transdniestria, and Moldova. The second is capacity development for women to play a strong role in peace processes, particularly in Africa. The case study method was used to analyse the intended and unintended effects of the activities, particularly in relation to their context. The cases were carefully selected to reflect Finnish Government priorities, a live negotiation, and processes where an evaluation would not risk causing harm to the peace process.

## Relevance

CMI's overall strategy is to increase inclusiveness in peace processes, and bring new skills and analysis to bear. CMI enjoys very good access to high level

decision makers, and a strong credibility in relation to mediation and dialogue. Its outreach is readily accepted by external stakeholders, and CMI staff or partners are actively used in the design and delivery of peace activities.

There is a focus in the programming of CMI on mid to high level decision makers, but the programming is also highly responsive to the needs of the weaker stakeholders - whether these are the marginalised leadership groups, or more particularly women, in conflict resolution situations. CMI promotes inclusiveness by providing tools and arenas for participatory engagement, and stressing the value of politically inclusive settlements.

### **Efficiency**

The organisation has developed very strong risk management and financial systems, building on the strengths of a highly qualified senior management team. There is a strong emphasis on cost control, and a willingness to innovate in the area of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation for mediation activities.

M&E and the tracking of performance is however extremely challenging against the background of existing results-based management systems which prevail in development aid. Mediation activities have to be, by nature, protected by confidentiality so as not to undermine the positions of those the organisation is seeking to assist. It is also characterised by extensive complexity, where there are many unknown, unforeseen and cross cutting factors which require a strong sense of opportunity and flexibility in the projects. The assumption of linear cause-effect relationships, carefully planned at the outset and framed by indicators of performance, simply does not apply in these fluid conflict situations.

This need to adapt M&E is recognised by CMI, which has been working on the elaboration of more accurate ways of reporting on performance, while preserving its agility. The organisation has been informed of a 38% cut in funding from the MFA in 2015 which has generated a difficult restructuring period, and has been combined with the difficulty of adjusting Planning Monitoring and Evaluation, set against highly dynamic situations in places such as Yemen or Libya. There is a degree of corresponding weakness in the division of labour within the teams, and an element of confusion between financial and technical management at the lower levels of the organisation.

### **Effectiveness**

This rapid transition has however not affected the delivery of results by the organisation. An analysis of the intended and actual outcomes reveals also that CMI has been able to take advantage of unforeseen changes, and used the achievements it had generated in the past to good effect. This is particularly the case in Moldova where a new constellation of international mediation is able to rely on the capacities generated by an informal Group of Experts built by CMI.

The ability of the projects to understand and address challenges and constraints is considerable. The decentralised decision making and network structure is reflected in the strengths of the organisation as reported by stakeholders. CMI is praised both for its subject matter expertise, the opening of

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unhoped for contacts, and also its ability to provide long running and relatively undetermined support in relation to a particular peace process. It is seen as fully capable to provide on-the-ground, timely support.

### **Impact**

The paradox of the evaluation of peacebuilding is that any form of evidence of impact which is based on indicators and planning forecasts is often highly contested. This requires an evaluation based on particular pathways of engagement, and accessing information which may be sensitive to report. The M&E systems of CMI have not yet been able to address this challenge, which means that the descriptions of its impact are defined in broad terms of praise by high level and reputable stakeholders, rather than verified evidence.

This evaluation is however able to observe the way in which the ability of CMI to create new contacts in the international collaboration under the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in an informal dialogue group involving Russia and Germany, has enabled this negotiation to access bodies of expertise which are key to addressing some of the underlying issues of the conflict in Moldova. There is also evidence, through the feedback forms of participants in the gender training, that senior personnel of the African Union are applying new skills to the negotiations in Africa.

### **Sustainability**

The work of CMI is most frequently tied to groups and institutions that are well placed within a peace process. These are highly diverse, and may be CSOs, informal groups, or multilateral institutions. This is however an instrumental relationship, as the focus of the projects is on the personalities, their expertise and relationships, rather than on the actual organisations. The end pursued by CMI is to be able to influence the dialogue within the peace processes, and the capacities generated are only a means to an end.

The sustainability of the results achieved is also highly contingent on the peace process itself. There is however a deliberate effort by CMI to develop tools and knowledge which can be put to good use by other parties. Its own intellectual property, generated from its own experience and analytical tools, is often picked up and replicated by others, in a process that could be described as indirect sustainability.

The challenge of funding cuts occupies a significant place in CMI's planning for the future. It is naturally attracted to private sector funding, as bilateral and multilateral donors in the field of mediation are often more directive than the Finnish MFA. This access to private sector financing is still very undeveloped.

### **Complementarity and Coordination**

The level of CMI's coordination and communication is good. The informal and often confidential nature of peace brokering requires that for much of CMI's work information cannot necessarily be shared widely. There is no evidence however to show that CMI did not inform individuals or organisations whom it should have informed, beyond the normal complaints which may emerge in the course of power politics.



CMI, as some other Finnish CSOs, occupies a unique role within Finnish foreign policy and public image. The very perception of Finland as a constructive, enduring and low profile partner serves CMI, and is served by CMI.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

The challenge for this organisation with such a unique profile is to be found in the current dependence on public sources of funding, and on the inability to convey its impact in simple and verifiable terms. The current state of affairs will not prejudice the quality of work, but care needs to be taken with the effects of the commitments undertaken on the organisation of work, and its long term viability. There is a need to further grasp and explain the nature of CMI's impact, and to increase the financial sustainability of its funding. For the MFA, there is a need to preserve the independence and versatility of the work, in ways that do not renege on accountability.

The evaluation formulates seven detailed recommendations, which are further developed in the concluding section around two broad areas: one is to continue to develop the Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation systems of CMI to better fit with the nature of the work it carries out, and the other is to develop ways of using private capital to further its own objectives, as funding cuts from public donors could risk compromising the organization's independence. There is an underlying recommendation for the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to understand the value generated by such a CSO, and the importance of preserving the current supportive, arm's length relationship through core funding.

1. The alignment within which CMI is able to operate, between international norms and instruments, and the particularities of local conflicts, should be preserved. The MFA programme-based support is in this sense an important element of this ability to align and blend in. The relative autonomy and trust given to CMI in the formulation of the projects should be maintained.
2. The competency frameworks and job descriptions of staff should be better aligned, and ways should be found to ensure that some focal points within project activities are fully empowered to manage resources, while others are more outward oriented to deal with conflict situations.
3. CMI's current effort to focus more on the context in the current M&E system should be continued, with an emphasis given to multipliers<sup>3</sup> and the way in which specific projects relate to the context multipliers that are amenable to influence.
4. CMI must preserve its adaptive management style. This could be done even better by enabling feedback loops to be even more systematic and rapid, using more qualitative and real-time aspects of monitoring, giving due importance to unintended effect.

<sup>3</sup> This term is proposed by CMI as part of its emerging Theory of Change to mean factors that increase the probability of change, or critical conditions which exercise a preponderant degree of influence in the given context of a peace process.

**The independence and particularities of the organisation need to be preserved.**

5. The M&E system of CMI needs to be more strategic and grounded in the context. This can be done by better developing the conceptualisation and identification of the multipliers (or decisive conditions, or drivers) of change, and understand how the projects are affecting, or not, these drivers. There should be less emphasis on the planned/unplanned, or intended/unintended dichotomy, and less definition of the end states, but also more emphasis on real-time reporting and the capture of knowledge about the context, and anticipation of its upcoming evolution.
6. The independence and particularities of the organisation need to be preserved, and this does not automatically occur if one uses development aid instruments. This independence should not be threatened by a reduction in funding which would threaten the organisation's independence. There is an alternative to continued public grants, which lies in the MFA leveraging its resources to mobilise private capital. The area of impact investment offers significant opportunities.
7. The organisation needs to separate the requirements of confidentiality from its public communication, an area of its activities which is fully appropriate. Within M&E there should be a closer examination of ways of separating but still capturing sensitive information, as this is often where the most effective interventions are. One way to do that is to develop a scoring system where the overall score allows for an overview of performance, but the evidence base for this scoring is only accessible to a limited number of personnel mandated to assess the accuracy and materiality of the reporting.

# KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
<b>Relevance</b>		
CMI is fully relevant to conflict situations thanks to its own expertise and personnel, to the objectives of Finnish development policy, to the broad normative and international legal frameworks which affect its work.	There is a direct alignment on gender, human rights and the pursuit of sustainable peace, while maintaining also an ability to enter into relations of trust with the parties to a conflict.	1. The alignment within which CMI is able to operate, between international norms and instruments, and the particularities of local conflicts, should be preserved. The MFA programme-based support is in this sense an important element of this ability to align and blend in. The relative autonomy and trust given to CMI in the formulation of the projects should be maintained
<b>Efficiency</b>		
The outputs are valued by partners and represent a key contribution to highly dynamic situations in some 13 areas around the world, for a relatively modest annual budget.  A very strong risk management process has been developed over the period evaluated.	There is a constant effort to contain costs, but also at times a difficulty in ensuring that staff that are highly specialised in conflict resolution are also good at resource management. The most significant challenge lies in the nature M&E, which, as it is currently formulated, gives too much priority to linear planning hindsight, to the detriment of an insightful approach to complexity in conflicts.	2. The competency frameworks and job descriptions of staff should be better aligned, and ways should be found to ensure that some focal points within project activities are fully empowered to manage resources, while others are more outward oriented to deal with conflict situations.  3. CMI's current effort to focus more on the context in the current M&E system should be continued, with an emphasis given to multipliers <sup>4</sup> and the way in which specific projects relate to the context multipliers that are amenable to influence.
<b>Effectiveness</b>		
The intended outcomes achieved by the programme align clearly with the outcomes as originally intended. There is however a significant importance to unintended outcomes, which are the true value of CMI as a policy actor.	It is through its adaptiveness that the organisation is able to generate knowledge which is prized by external partners, and relationships which have more longevity than institutional links, and give it its influence.	4. CMI must preserve its adaptive management style. This could be done even better by enabling feedback loops to be even more systematic and rapid, using more qualitative and real-time aspects of monitoring, giving due importance to unintended effect.

<sup>4</sup> This term is proposed by CMI as part of its emerging Theory of Change to mean factors that increase the probability of change, or critical conditions which exercise a preponderant degree of influence in the given context of a peace process.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
<b>Impact</b>		
Even though there are clear narratives of impact, occasionally of a confidential nature, CMI has only begun to develop appropriate tools of its own to capture impact.	A significant dialogue with the architects of RBM within the MFA has not yet taken place. The parallel assessment on RBM in this evaluation concludes that, in the case of CMI, a very appropriate degree of importance is given to the process of MRE as well as to the actual products.	The MRE system of CMI needs to be more strategic and grounded in the context. This can be done by better developing the conceptualisation and identification of the multipliers (or decisive conditions, or drivers) of change, and understand how the projects are affecting, or not, these drivers. There should be less emphasis on the planned/unplanned, or intended/unintended dichotomy, and less definition of the end states, but also more emphasis on real-time reporting and the capture of knowledge about the context, and anticipation of its upcoming evolution.
<b>Sustainability</b>		
The transient nature of institutions in conflict precludes a focus on the institution, and encourages a focus on relationships. The consequence is that there is much less importance given to sustainable institutions.	The actor-driven nature of CMI's engagement in conflict mediation, and the strong focus on expertise, both in terms of subject matter and country situations, is important. It is the key to the sustainability of the results achieved in terms of conflict resolution.	The independence and particularities of the organisation need to be preserved, and this does not automatically occur if one uses development aid instruments. This independence should not be threatened by a reduction in funding which would threaten the organisation's independence. There is an alternative to continued public grants, which lies in the MFA leveraging its resources to mobilise private capital. The area of impact investment offers significant opportunities.
<b>Complementarity, Coordination</b>		
There is no evidence that CMI has not informed other actors that it should have informed, and its institutional relations are essentially collaborative. It works well with all categories of actors and appropriately uses the Finnish funding modalities, Programme Support, project funding from the political departments, and also private sector financing.	Communication, coordination and complementarity are well understood aspects of the organisation. These create the room for maneuver which is required for it to be effective, and how the organisation generates its mandates.	The organisation needs to separate the requirements of confidentiality from its public communication, an area of its activities which is fully appropriate. Within MRE there should be a closer examination of ways of separating but still capturing sensitive information, as this is often where the most effective interventions are. One way to do that is to develop a scoring system where the overall score allows for an overview of performance, but the evidence base for this scoring is only accessible to a limited number of personnel mandated to assess the accuracy and materiality of the reporting.

# 1 INTRODUCTION

The evaluation of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) is part of the six evaluations commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), of Finnish Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). The CSOs receive multiannual programme-based support from MFA. The other five CSOs being evaluated are Fairtrade Finland, Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission, Finnish Refugee Council, Taksvärkki (ODW Finland) and World Wildlife Fund Finland.

The overall evaluation process consists of two components:

1. Component 1 collects data on the results of the programmes of the selected six organizations and assesses their value and merit to different stakeholders.
2. Component 2 assesses how well the results-based management (RBM) mechanisms of each organization that receives programme-based support function and to what extent there is a link between RBM and achieving results.

The Terms of Reference for the assignment are presented in Annex 1. In 2014 the programme-based support received by 22 Finnish CSOs amounted to € 80 million. These CSOs are granted a special status in the financing application process, receiving funding for 2-4 year program proposals granted through programme application rounds which are not open to others. They have been guided by the same policy guidelines as the rest of the Finland's support to CSOs: Development Policy Programme of Finland (2012) as well as the Guidelines for Civil Society in Development Policy (2010).

## 2 APPROACH, METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

### 2.1 Evaluation rationale and objectives

The purpose of the evaluation is to provide evidence-based information and guidance for the next update of the Guidelines for Civil Society in Development Policy as well as for the programme-based modality on how to:

1. improve the results-based management approach in the programme-based support to civil society for management, learning and accountability purposes and
2. enhance the achievement of results in the implementation of the Finnish development policy at the civil society programme level.

The objectives of the evaluation are:

- to provide independent and objective evidence of results (outcome, output and impact) from the civil society development cooperation programmes receiving programme-based support;
- to provide evidence of successes and challenges of the civil society development cooperation programmes by assessing the value and merit of the obtained results from the perspective of MFA policy, CSOs programme and beneficiary level;
- to provide evidence of the functioning of RBM in the organizations receiving programme support;
- to provide evidence of the successes and challenges of the programme-support funding modality from the RBM point of view.

The overall evaluation includes two components:

- Component 1 collects data on the results of the programmes of the six organizations selected and assesses their value and merit to different stakeholders. This report pertains to Component 1.
- Component 2 assesses the functioning of the RBM mechanisms of each organization receiving programme-based support including the link between the RBM and achieving results.

### 2.2 Approach and Methodology

The evaluation of CMI was carried out from December 2015 to June 2016 in three phases: an Inception Phase which was designed to create a common under-

standing of the aims of the programmes and the evidence of performance, a Field Phase which led to the production of the current report, and a Synthesis and Dissemination phase.

The inception phase included the elaboration of an evaluation matrix containing the evaluation questions and the sources of evidence (Annex 2). In addition, desk studies of documents (Annex 4) as well reconstruction of the Theory of Change (ToC) for the CMI programmes were carried out. Meetings were organized at the MFA (EVA-11, KEO-30 staff) and with the CMI Finland staff.

The methodology adopted involved case studies, for which generalizable evidence was collected from two projects within CMI's portfolio. The findings generated by these studies were then triangulated with other information captured through document study and stakeholder interviews. The approach was focused around these two case studies as agreed in the Inception Phase (when the two projects were selected), due to the sensitivity of the information which is managed by CMI. This sensitivity is due to the fact that key CMI partners routinely engage in strategies which would be undermined by publicity. Thus some of the evidence is of a confidential nature.

The case study method was used to probe particular levels of the theory of change, and the cases were selected to reflect Finnish Government priorities, live negotiations and processes where an evaluation would not risk causing harm. The method allows for the analysis of all the criteria covered by the Evaluation Matrix in a specific manner. The case studies are bounded aspects of project delivery, where evidence can be verifiably collected, and which illustrate the work of the organisation as a whole.

The case studies chosen were geographically defined (for example Moldova) or thematically defined (women in peace processes):

- ◆ **Supporting a Stronger Role for Women in Peace Processes** is part of the thematic Gender and Inclusion stream and combines two approaches to create strategic impact. The first is working with women's groups to strengthen peace process architecture, and the second is building capacity among mediators and other key peace process support actors. CMI conceptualises this work not as mainstreaming, but rather as focusing on both the supply and demand side of women's meaningful participation in peace processes. This was described by one CMI staff member as 'lateral approaches to unblocking peace processes by allowing new stakeholders to be brought in, rather than a mechanical inclusion of women by numbers'.
- ◆ A geographically defined activity was selected, where field work and observation of an current initiative was possible. For the past several years, CMI has been active in Moldova contributing to the Transdnestrian settlement process. It seeks to facilitate improved relations among key actors on both sides by creating informal yet structured and facilitated opportunities for interaction. The main vehicle is the recourse to a high-level dialogue group, consisting of senior experts from both sides. In 2015, the dialogue group focused on trade issues, interlinking their analysis with providing recommendations on how to tackle both economic and political issues.

Information was collected from CMI during visits to Moldova and Brussels, during which the evaluators interviewed programme partners, stakeholders and beneficiaries. The evaluation matrix guided key informant interviews, group discussions and field observations with key partners, stakeholders, and donors.

The analytical design of the evaluation included an analysis of:

- The formally defined objectives of the interventions as reflected in MFA policies, the funding applications, and CMI's strategies, in particular the 2014 document entitled "Every Peace Matters".
- The key drivers of change as captured within the case studies and by the documentation on problem analyses by CMI for the evidence reviewed as secondary data by the evaluators.
- The process for the delivery and management of the initiatives, with particular focus on the outputs achieved in the case studies, but also those reported more generally.

The evaluation criteria and the evaluation questions represent a probing of the quality of the links among these three elements. The findings were assessed in relation to the overall theory of change as described in the Inception Report within the wider field of Finnish development cooperation. In doing this the team asked the following questions, all of which relate to the assumptions underlying Finnish CSOs theory of change:

- To what extent are the programmes of CMI's partners relevant to and contribute to the achievement of a sustainable peace? This includes assessing outcomes relating to the strengthening of capacities of partner CSOs in the target countries to play their specific roles. (EQs 1.4 and 3.3).
- What is the evidence that the partnerships between CMI and others in partner countries strengthens democracy and development owned by the people? (EQ 1.4).
- What efforts have been made by the partners to establish cross-sector partnership and cooperation? Has this produced any positive outcomes? (EQs 6.1 and 6.2).
- What are the benefits of programme support to CMI and the delivery of results? (EQs 2.1, 3.3 and 3.5).
- To what extent has CMI created effective links to the grassroots in target countries? (EQs 1.4 and 5.1).
- How have the programmes complemented Finland's other bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation with the public and private sectors in the target countries? (EQs 1.4 and 6.2)
- To what extent has CMI enjoyed full autonomy and operational freedom to pursue its own strategic direction with the programme-based support? (EQ 1.1).



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The information collected led to conclusions which have related recommendations that are both encouraging strengths and compensating for weaknesses.

The list of people interviewed is provided in Annex 3. A workshop was organized in Finland to validate the findings with the partners, other stakeholders and CMI Finland, in the presence of MFA personnel.

## 2.3 Limitations

The limitations to the evaluation include:

- The iterative nature of peacebuilding requires considerable informality, adaptation and also, to some degree, confidentiality.
- Force majeure affected the first evaluator, who had to be replaced upon initiation of the field work. This led to some delay because of the need to mobilise another person.

The evaluation was however able to count on the support of CMI staff and partners, and to access the information in an efficient manner to meet the objectives set out in the Terms of Reference.

# 3 THE BROADER CONTEXT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

## 3.1 Finland's policy for support to civil society

The Guidelines for Civil Society in Development policy define the overall development cooperation objective of Finland's support to civil society as: 'A vibrant and pluralistic civil society based on the rule of law, whose activities support and promote the achievement of development goals and enhanced human-well-being' (MFA 2010).

This objective is in line with and supportive of the human rights-based approach to development (HRBA) which underpins Finland's development policy and cooperation. Within the HRBA, the most important task of civil society is to empower citizens to claim their rights, influence public decision-making and to take responsibility for their own lives. The immediate target of development cooperation in the HRBA is CSOs acting as agents of change (MFA 2013).

The Civil Society Guidelines stress that Finland's civil society objective can be achieved in two ways: capacity development of CSOs in the targeted countries and the creation of a supportive environment for civil society activities. Civil society is seen as having two basic functions: advocacy that focuses on political decision-makers, governance and public opinion, making the voice of citizens heard and strengthening their participation; and the provision of services where the state lacks adequate capacity (MFA 2015).

The programme-based support is the mechanism through which Finland finances the programmes of the six Finnish CSOs, which are the subject of this evaluation. Finnish partnership organizations apply periodically for funding of up to 85 per cent of the costs of their strategic programmes.

The aim of the partnerships between MFA and the CSOs, is to strengthen the position of civil society and individual actors as channels of independent civilian activity in both Finland and the developing countries. Other objectives are to boost global solidarity, empower locals to exercise influence, and improve cooperation and interaction between the public authorities and civil society actors. The central role, therefore, of the partners - regardless of their organisational mission, sectoral expertise, forms of work, countries of operation and specific stakeholders is to strengthen civil society in developing countries.

## 3.2 Description of CMI

The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) is an independent Finnish organisation created in 2000 as an extension of the personal office of Nobel Peace Laureate and former President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari (the offices are still co-located and work in tandem). Its mandate is derived from the activities of the personal office, which has created numerous initiatives for conflict resolution, which in turn have generated expertise and contacts. CMI grew rapidly from 2010 and entered the programme-based support scheme with MFA in 2013. By 2016 CMI operated in some thirteen areas of the world, with a budget of about €7 million, and 65 staff.

The organisation underwent progressive growth as it engaged in a number of peace facilitation assignments, a growth which accelerated from 2009, when CMI had ten staff. By early 2016, CMI employed some 65 staff (about a half of whom operate as retained consultants), with offices in Helsinki and Brussels. The offices in Jordan and South Sudan were closed after the budget cuts in 2015, when the organisation had reached a peak staffing of 75. This structure is overlaid by a network of advisors and project managers operating in virtual offices in some 20 locations, at any point in time.

CMI's mission is "to prevent and resolve violent conflict by involving all actors relevant to achieving sustainable peace". The mission is addressed through fifteen current peacebuilding projects implemented in:

- Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia;
- the Middle East; North Africa and Sahel; and,
- Sub-Saharan Africa.

The Middle East and North Africa regions have recently been merged as a result of budget cuts.

The three heads of the geographical teams, supervised by the Programme Director, are responsible for the planning and implementation of programmatic actions in their respective regions. The activities are carried out as projects. Each project has a Project Manager, or a dedicated Project Officer, who is responsible for the daily management and monitoring of project activities. Project teams consist of Project Managers, Project Officers and Advisors who are experienced subject matter experts bringing another quality assurance dimension to the projects, and Project Assistants. Budget cuts have reduced the number of Project Managers, leading to more of an hour-glass structure for the organisation.

CMI delivers in three broad areas which it describes as sub-programmes: (1) mediation and dialogue (focused on mid-to-high level unofficial processes reaching to the actual conflict parties), (2) mediation support (focused on capacity building of actors mandated and external to the conflict), and (3) support to states and societies in conflict prevention and resolution (to support specific actors in a mandate that is assigned by actors within the country).

Hence the work is distributed in a matrix structure: with the geographical divisions cut across by the sub-programmes. The 'boxes' in this matrix contain the

projects, which are defined by specific donor contributions to these regions and these sub-programmes. Each project comes with its own budget and specific reporting format.

These differences allow the sub-programmes to establish relatively clear roles in relation to the leadership of the principal parties in a conflict. For example, this defines the role of CMI in relation to the opposition groups in Iraq<sup>5</sup>, or to Saudi decision makers in relation to Yemen. The legitimacy and credibility of CMI's involvement is at least as important as the quality of personnel and the services that it provides.

Each sub-programme emerges from the request of the key actors in a conflict, and is designed to contribute to the achievement of CMI's mission statement: 'to prevent and resolve violent, political conflicts.' The activities nearly always evolve over time as partners and opportunities emerge. CMI senior management describes the work of the organisation as being decreasingly technical, as the political dimension becomes increasingly important.

At an initial meeting with the team in Helsinki on 22 December 2015, CMI outlined its programme logic. The outputs of CMI activities in all three sub-programmes are designed collectively to achieve positive outcomes in five key areas of peace practice: solutions (to conflicts and problems), inclusion (of all relevant actors), trust (of conflict parties and relevant stakeholders), channels (of communication); and capacity development (of individuals, organisations, states). Positive change in these areas is intended 'to contribute significantly to peace processes.' (cf. section 4.2.1 of the Inception Report).

The annual budget 2015 for CMI's Finnish MFA funded programme was €6 million, which includes matching funding (15%). The actual expenses were €5.7 million. Total MFA funding available without matching funding was €4.7 million, including both the initial programme (€4.4 m) and carryovers from previous years (€0.3 m). Over the past five years MFA provided roughly 60% of the total funding, with 20% coming from Foundations, 18% from other bilateral donors, and 2% from private sources (Table 1).

**Table 1: Cumulative Funding of CMI in €.**


<b>Funder</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
<b>Finland</b>	5,561,003.20	4,848,604.35
<b>Foundations</b>	1,764,336.09	1,186,759.85
<b>EU</b>	0.00	212,186.75
<b>Other governments</b>	300,013.25	860,036.57
<b>Other</b>	146,675.49	354,521.53
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>7,772,028.03</b>	<b>7,462,109.05</b>

Source: CMI finance 2016


<sup>5</sup> CMI made the following comment on this example : "The report mentions CMI's work in Gagauzia and Iraq. While both have their origins in activities conducted under the Finnish MFA partnership, technically, currently both projects operate outside of the partnership and do not receive Finnish funding. Such examples reflect however on the overall nature of CMI's programme, as an effective means for generating new sustainable, high-impact projects - which legitimizes the presence of these references in this report".

The biggest advantages of MFA funding from the point of view of CMI has been the possibility of adjusting funding allocations among projects, and MFA's acceptance of funding received by CMI from the general public and the private sector as matching funding. However CMI's total funding in year 2015 was €7.5 million, which is 4% less than in the previous year. This has been further accentuated following the cuts of 38% in Finnish project and partnership funding, which forced the closure of a number of projects (for example the socio-economic dialogue in Morocco, or supporting the dialogue for peace in Afghanistan). Ten staff had to be retrenched rather suddenly. The Methods and Tools team and the Programme Development and Coordination team were terminated and the Project Management Office (PMO) was established. The funding changes between 2014 and 2015 are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.

**Figure 1: Sources of Funding to CMI in 2014**



**Figure 2: Sources of Funding to CMI in 2015**



CMI became a member of the MFA programme-based support framework in 2014, which is now providing 80-90% of the total funding, while other Units also provide specific project based funding, such as the Unit for UN and General Global Affairs.

**CMI's mission is to prevent and resolve violent conflict by involving all actors relevant to achieving sustainable peace.**

### 3.3 Theory of Change

CMI's work is based on the assumption that all conflicts have the potential to be resolved peacefully. The underlying premise is that a conflict, no matter how intractable it may seem, is the result of human will, which the staff of CMI are convinced they can affect through informed interventions that are both more inclusive and better implemented. This leads to a deliberate effort to adjust the planning and M&E systems to the nature of conflict, which is increasingly moving away from classic development tools.

CMI's mission is to prevent and resolve violent conflict by involving all actors relevant to achieving sustainable peace. The mission is described as providing the starting point for a programme of 15 peacebuilding projects (Every Peace Matters, 2014-2016) implemented in four regions of the world: Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia; the Middle East; North Africa and Sahel; and Sub-Saharan Africa. The programme comprises three broad areas of activity, or sub-programmes: mediation and dialogue, mediation support, and support to states and societies in conflict prevention and resolution. Each sub-programme has immediate, or specific objectives which in combination are intended to contribute to the achievement of impact, described by an overall objective which corresponds closely to the mission statement: 'to prevent and resolve violent, political conflicts.'

With each project focused on action in one or more of the sub-programmes, a generic programme logframe has been developed (Table 2) to summarise CMI's common intervention logic and integrate the management of project activities and results at the organisational level.

**Table 2: Generic Programme logframe of CMI**

<b>Overall objective</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
Prevent and resolve violent conflicts	None provided
<b>Sub-programme I: Mediation &amp; Dialogue</b>	
<b>Purpose</b>	Enhance the prospects for potential and existing peace processes, support their effectiveness and ensure the sustainability of results
<b>Overall objective</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Increase trust, develop channels for dialogue and capacities of conflict parties to enable conducive environments for peace processes.</li> <li>2. Support the provision of alternative inclusion strategies to facilitate the engagement of parties relevant to peace processes.</li> <li>3. Provide concrete and substantive input to support the search for solutions.</li> </ol>	<p>Quality of the targeted peace process, including</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Conflict parties' willingness and capability to search for peaceful solutions</li> <li>2. Relevant actors' ability to contribute to and engage in peace processes</li> <li>3. Peace process' track-record in tackling relevant questions, finding solutions and implementing them</li> </ol>
<b>Results</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Confidence between CMI participants and their close constituencies has increased and their willingness and capacities to engage in dialogue and negotiations has improved.</li> <li>2. Engagement of CMI participants to the peace process is ensured and their priorities are addressed.</li> <li>3. Joint solutions and options are developed through CMI-facilitated dialogue and addressed.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participants' and their close constituencies' reported attitudes towards peace process</li> <li>• Participants' and their close constituencies' reported trust and confidence towards other conflict parties</li> <li>• Participants' and their close constituencies' capacity to participate in the peace process</li> <li>• Participants' and their close constituencies' linkages to different tracks</li> <li>• Number and quality of analysis and recommendations produced</li> <li>• Level of agreement on the issues discussed among the participants</li> <li>• Level of advocacy on the analysis and recommendations produced</li> <li>• Level of adaptation of analysis and recommendations in the official documents</li> <li>• Diversity of the background of the individuals engaged</li> <li>• Number of individuals engaged</li> <li>• Number of workshops organised</li> </ul>
<b>Sub-programme II: Mediation support</b>	
<b>Purpose</b>	Enable states, multinational organisations and key individuals to be better equipped to undertake and support mediation endeavours.
<b>Specific objectives</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strengthen capabilities of organizations and individuals involved in mediation to engage and support effective mediation processes.</li> <li>2. Support the effective implementation of formal mediation and dialogue initiatives.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Organizations' and individuals' skills and capacities to engage in mediation &amp; dialogue</li> <li>2. Quality of the targeted peace process, including <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Conflict parties' willingness and capability to search for peaceful solutions</li> <li>b) Relevant actors' ability to contribute to and engage in peace processes</li> <li>c) Peace process' track-record in tackling relevant questions, finding solutions and implementing them</li> </ol> </li> </ol>

<b>Overall objective</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
<b>Results</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Relevant individuals within target organizations and other key individuals, who CMI is supporting, are better equipped to engage in and support effective mediation efforts within their regions and globally.</li> <li>2. Mediation teams targeted by CMI activities are better able to design and implement the mediation process effectively.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reported change in skills and capacities in mediation and dialogue of organisations and individuals engaged</li> <li>• Reported change in capacity of mediation teams to conduct the mandated activities</li> <li>• Number of individuals, organisations and mediation teams engaged</li> <li>• Number of trainings and workshops organised</li> <li>• Backgrounds of the individuals, organisations and mediation teams engaged</li> <li>• Number and quality of publications</li> </ul>
<b>Sub-programme III: Support to states and societies in conflict prevention and resolution</b>	
<b>Purpose</b>	Support states and societal actors in participatory design and implementation of policies and practices relevant for conflict prevention and resolution in fragile contexts.
<b>Specific objectives</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strengthen the capacities of state and key societal actors in participatory design and implementation of policies and practices which have impact on conflict prevention and resolution.</li> <li>2. Strengthen the effectiveness and inclusiveness of policy processes which have direct impact on conflict prevention and resolution.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. States' ability to engage different political and societal actors in the design and implementation of policy processes</li> <li>2. Effectiveness of the supported policy process, including <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Inclusiveness of the policy process</li> <li>b) Sustainability of the policy process</li> </ol> </li> </ol>
<b>Results</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Actors targeted by CMI activities are better able to design and implement conflict prevention, resolution and transition processes through cross-sectoral, cross-political and/or cross-societal participation.</li> <li>2. Policy processes supported by CMI activities produce analysis and recommendations that are sustainable and acceptable to relevant actors.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reported change in skills and capacities of targeted actors to design and implement participatory processes</li> <li>• Number and quality of analysis and recommendations produced</li> <li>• Level of agreement on the issues discussed among the participants</li> <li>• Level of advocacy on the analysis and recommendations produced</li> <li>• Diversity of the background of the individuals engaged</li> <li>• Number of individuals engaged</li> <li>• Number of trainings and workshops organised</li> </ul>



At the launch of the evaluation in December 2015, CMI outlined a highly simplified version of their programme logframe. The outputs of CMI activities in all three sub-programmes are designed collectively to achieve positive outcomes in five key areas of peace practice: solutions (to conflicts and problems), inclusion (of all relevant actors), trust (of conflict parties and relevant stakeholders), channels (of communication); and capacity development (of individuals, organisations, states). Positive change in these areas is intended ‘to contribute significantly to peace processes.’

In CMI, while there are detailed planning frameworks, such as the annual programme and tri-annual Reporting, there is a significant degree of difficulty affecting the first two options. The first, net change relies on a relatively simple causality between an intervention and a later change, or on strictly comparable situations - which simply does not occur and is not selected as an option. Similar challenges occur for theories of change in aggregating from one level to the next, with significant difficulty in separating external and cross-cutting influences from those of the CMI interventions. It should however be noted that the M&E systems for the outcome and impact levels of influence are properly developed.


Consequently, and in light of the three models outlined above, the present evaluation adopted a straightforward mapping of outcomes and inference on impact. The M&E system of CMI itself is also evolving in response to these challenges.

The concrete activities that lead to these results fall under at least one of the three thematic sub-programmes. Successful processes call for a deep understanding of the specific contexts and a long term commitment.

An innovation introduced at the end of 2014 was the introduction of the fluid interaction of these outcomes with decisive conditions within the context, or drivers, of change, which CMI has called “multipliers”. These are intricate complexes of circumstances which require particular attention, whether the multipliers describe conditions of ripeness, the importance of specific actors, or the tipping points of systemic changes. CMI has determined that some of these multipliers may be within its sphere of influence, and it should consequently seek to influence them, while it must adapt to others. Similarly, CMI increasingly aims to control who it chooses to work with and how. It seeks to follow key principles of peacebuilding work: impartiality, local ownership, inclusiveness, complementarity and coordination.

A new Theory of Change was created by CMI at the end of 2015. This is presented in Figure 3 below:

**Figure 3:** CMI Emerging Theory of Change



The Theory of Change seeks to introduce the complex interface between outcomes and context which constitutes the most significant challenge to the planning and M&E functions in the organisation.

CMI is in fact increasingly edging away from linear frameworks to plan and assess its performance, although these frameworks are still being used, in line with current MFA guidance. In 2014-2015 CMI reviewed its internal tools in programme management, and Boston Consulting Group trained some of the staff in Rigorous Programme Management methods. It introduced road-maps as a tool to link planning and monitoring in a dynamic manner. This has already resulted in a tailored risk management process, adding to the internal planning and reporting tools. Based on the in-kind assistance received from the Boston Consulting Group, it has trained the staff on risk registers.

Today, CMI's risk categorisation acknowledges three kinds of risks: managerial, operational and reputational. These are further divided into eight sub-categories:

- Managerial risks: Corruption, Security and safety, Internal management, Risks related to partners;
- Operational risks: Planning risks, Implementation risks, Impact risks;
- Reputation risks to CMI from the roles it may take in specific situations.

The resulting matrix (used for planning in 2014, 2015 and 2016) is presented in Figure 4. CMI staff members assess the level of the eight risks they face while planning and implementing projects with a grading of (1) for low; (2) medium; (3) high and (4) very high. This is seen as a continuous process to manage changes. The work takes place as part of the ordinary implementation within the teams and through the normal line management of the supervisors.

Finally, within CMI activities over the period 2010-2015, in addition to the continuous formal monitoring of implementation, there is a rolling narrative assessment process. The project team and the regional head hold a monitoring discussion at least once a month. Regular visits are carried out and project staff write activity and mission reports after each project visit, monitored against project milestones. The regional teams organise internal meetings, which include project reflection exercises. The Project Document, the Results Framework and the Risk Assessment are used in reflection meetings and planning workshops.

Figure 4: Risk Assessment Linked to CMI Planning

		Overall Programme Risk Report / 2016 Planning												Overall	
		EECCA			MENA				SSA		Gender		CMI		
		Moldova	Ukraine	Caucasus	Libya	Yemen	Palestine	Syria	AMC	South Sudan	Gender 1	Gender 2	QARMO	Comms	
Managerial risk	Corruption	1	1	2	3	3	1	1	1	3	2	2	1	1	2
	Security and safety	2	2	2	3	4	2	3	2	3	3	2	3	1	2
Operational risk	Internal management	1	4	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	1	2	1	2
	Partners	1	2	2	N/A	N/A	2	1	2	3	2	3	1	N/A	2
Reputation risk	Planning	2	1	2	3	3	2	2	1	3	1	2	1	2	2
	Implementation	2	1	1	3	3	3	1	1	2	2	3	2	2	2
	Impact	2	2	1	3	3	3	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
<b>Overall score:</b>		2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2

Source: CMI

### 3.4 Assumptions

A certain number of key assumptions were identified during the evaluation's Inception Phase, for the whole organisation, which, if fulfilled, would enable the organisation to move from the output to the impact level:

1. Mediation and facilitation of dialogue by independent, unofficial actors contributes effectively to conflict prevention and conflict resolution (peace processes).
2. The quality and potential impact of peace processes are dependent on working with 'key individuals,' including decision-makers, opinion formers, those who have direct and indirect access to decision-makers, as well as those who can claim legitimacy in representing the views of their constituencies.
3. Effective peace processes involve the inclusion of a full range of political and social groups at all levels of society, including women and the marginalised.
4. Improved capacity of mediators and participants in terms of mediation skills, conflict analysis, reflection and learning, dialogue capabilities, and access to information, significantly enhances the quality of peace processes and their potential impact.
5. CMI's impartiality and its skills and experience in peacebuilding are recognised by participants and all relevant actors.
6. The development of policies towards conflict prevention and conflict resolution by means of broad participation and wide-reaching consultation is an effective means of preventing and mitigating internal conflict.

The two case studies and the broader review of the programme confirm the fact that these assumptions are fully met in CMI operations. The evidence is presented in the following sections.

Of particular importance are the credibility of CMI, illustrated through interviews, and the demand for the organisation's services in a very wide variety of situations. The more broad-based and capable mediation and analytical skills of the participants are clearly factors that can improve the chances for peace to be reached.

The right hand column of the Logical Framework in Table 2 presents a form of evidence that is on the other hand very difficult to verify. An indicator-based approach would require at the very least a basket of indicators, but even those, if designed beforehand, would risk becoming obsolete due to changes within the conflict situation.

CMI is fully aware of the difficulty this creates for M&E. It has carried out a number of innovations in its approaches, which can be summarised as making it more adapted to complexity: to unpredictable and non-linear processes, to the sudden emergence of new dynamics, and above all the need for a humble approach to the reality of conflict. The emphasis is on moving away from pre-determined approaches, towards a methodology that emphasises the quality of the process of implementation. This is described in the following section.

## 3.5 Introduction to the projects being studied

### 3.5.1 Support to Gender and Inclusion

CMI's thematic project, "Supporting a Stronger Role for Women in Peace Processes", focuses on support to official mediators and negotiators and female peacebuilders in Central and Eastern Africa, in particular those engaged in peacebuilding through the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of Central Africa States (ECCAS). The concept here is to intervene in direct support of multilateral organisations operating in conflict situations and to provide greater awareness of the role of women.

The project broadens the scope of CMI's previous project, Gender Based Violence and Mediation in West Africa, working with the project's high-level Advisory Board and utilising its methodological outputs. The specific objective is not only to equip women for scenarios that may come up in their work, but to enable them to see political entry points and opportunities to do their peacemaking work better. Appropriate tools and approaches are provided through the training sessions, seminars and other forms of interaction.

The project includes strategic capacity development to support gender awareness in peace processes, in partnership with Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) and the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA). It includes needs-based technical and capacity support to AU's unit for Women, Peace, and Security and ECCAS on inclusive and gendered approaches to dialogue and mediation with a special focus on the Central African Republic; and dissemination of relevant evidence and learning from CMI's engagement in policy, practice and research. The programme was initiated at the end of 2013, and is supported by three staff members.

The overall objective of the project is to increase the effective representation of women and their views in peace processes and the use of gendered and inclusive perspectives in peacemaking, such that process are more effective and sustainable.

The specific objectives are to achieve:

1. Increased and more nuanced awareness of gender and of women's effective participation;
2. Increased understanding and capacities in relation of the different options and possibilities offered by inclusion among key peacemaking and mediation actors such as the UN, regional organizations, private diplomacy actors and insider mediators;
3. Increased capacities by regional actors in gender-sensitive mediation and facilitation of the inclusion of gender issues in peace agreements; and
4. Adjustments to existing mediation support strategies and practices, and developing new and where possible innovative ones to strengthen the role of women in peace processes in targeted countries/regions where CMI is active in the interest of more effective, sustainable peace processes.

At the regional level in Africa, the Regional Economic Communities, such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), are part of the wider continental security system and building blocks of the African Union, conceptualised as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). While the AU maintains overall responsibility for peace and security issues on the continent, regional organisations, being geographically close to and often more affected by civil and regionalized conflicts, are considered principal conflict resolution actors in their respective sub-regions. In addition to the AU and the regional bodies, the United Nations plays an important role in peace and security in Africa through its various peacekeeping operations in countries, such as Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan.

Along with regional and international organisations, various non-state actors - ranging from religious leaders to civil society organizations and women's groups - play an important role in supporting peace processes. In many conflict situations, non-state actors have played a crucial role in advocating for peace, opening up informal avenues for dialogue, and providing dynamic channels of communication between opposing belligerents. Non-state actors have also often successfully complemented the formal mediation efforts of governments and regional/international organizations. These are the chosen stakeholders of CMI.

The project has delivered four streams of activity:

1. Strategic capacity building to support gender awareness in peace processes: this included in 2015 the CMI/PRIO/UNDP high level seminar on gender and inclusive mediation; in 2016 CMI supports the partner organisation in the implementation by providing assistance in identifying and selecting participants to the training. CMI is also an operational partner that provides ad-hoc support to the Nordic Women's Mediation initiative led by the MFA.
2. On a continuous basis CMI delivers continuous advisory services for regional actors to support gender awareness and inclusivity in peace processes. This allows them to strengthen the practical skills of high level regional organization and independent mediators in using gender approaches and engaging women at all levels in their work in the region.
3. A special focus has been given to regional liaison persons in Economic Community of Central African States member countries.
4. The gender team participates in some strategic sector-relevant policy events to contribute to global discourse based on CMI's work on the ground.

The CMI implementing partners are the African Union and Economic Community of Central African States, Gender Unit, UN Women, Peace Research Institute of Oslo, and the United Nations Department of Political Affairs' Mediation Support Unit.

### 3.5.2 Support to Moldova and Transdniestria

Based out of Chisinau, the capital of Moldova, CMI is working with two national organisations, Mediator in Tiraspol, Transdniestria, and Contact in Chisinau. The project here started in 2012, and has exercised considerable continuity in its methodology. It has organised a Group of Experts that meet regularly to provide analysis and advice to key actors. This highly informal group has, according to all available sources, managed to integrate individuals with contacts with all parties, working for the private sector, the public sector, or in politics. The numbers fluctuate from 10 to 20, but a core group of about 8 has remained throughout. The discussions and products of this group are balanced, and their effect relies on the fact that they do not use their influence to coerce or denounce, but rather to persuade.

The group is engaging in regular discussions and joint analysis of the most important political, economic and social trends with the potential to influence the settlement process. The group has been generating recommendations for the official negotiators and the international community and offering direct support to the official talks. Thus, in 2014, the political sub-group developed the analytical paper on the resumption of the political negotiations entitled “The way to restart the political process of Transdniestrian settlement” that was presented to official negotiators and the international community. The recommendations on reforming the process in 2016 during the German chairmanship were presented to the Special Representative of OSCE Chairperson-in-office, and representatives of German MFA, in Berlin in November 2015.

CMI is facilitating a structured exchange on trade and related specialized issues involving the group, local and international experts. As a result of their joint analysis and meetings with international stakeholders and study tours, the group produced technical trade and economic papers, as well as the analysis connecting trade and political issues. Their joint ability to look jointly for solutions and engage with stakeholders reflects their improved capacities.

As a part of this approach, key stakeholders, including Transdniestrian businesses were engaged to discuss the prospects and challenges of trade in the current situation. The inclusion of businesses directly affected by the new trade agreement into dialogue with international and local policy-makers shaping the agreement to provide their input was unique and generated great interest.

CMI and the group initiated dialogue with economic experts in Russia and the Eurasian commission staff. By building these channels, and building a fuller basis for analysis, the high-level group improved their shared understanding on trade issues – notable in a situation where such dialogue is absent. Improving relationships with actors in Brussels, Moscow, and Kiev has long-term impact on the group’s ability to continue productive work. The group also established an informal channel with negotiators on both sides to provide mutual updates. CMI and the Dialogue Group prepared parliamentary actors for engaging in informal dialogue, an area of development for 2016. A comprehensive analysis of past efforts in parliamentary cooperation was undertaken. CMI experts elaborated a joint analytical paper “Participation of Legislative Bodies of the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestrian in Providing Support to the Settlement Process. Working Cooperation Mechanisms”. Thus, the analytical basis



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has been developed to support a comprehensive and strategic approach to parliamentary dialogue by all sides. Earlier work by the High Level group resulted in a shared strategic approach to cooperation, which was shared with target actors in the parliaments.

In 2015, the high level dialogue group had intensive consultations with the OSCE Chairmanship Special Representative that turned into a longer-term mechanism of consultation between the Special Representative and members of the expert group. Most of the recommendations provided by the group, such as analysis of documents, inclusion of the parliamentary dimension into the peace process, were adopted as official agenda items for the chairmanship; by facilitating dialogue with senior actors within a mechanism, or core groups of actors drawn from the two sides of the conflict and the five international players (OSCE, EU, Russia, USA, Ukraine) party to the official “5+2” peace process.

# 4 FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## 4.1 Relevance

CMI's overall strategy as described in 'Every Peace Matters' is to increase inclusiveness in peace processes, and bring new skills and analysis to bear. CMI enjoys good access to high level decision makers, and a strong credibility in relation to mediation and dialogue. This was illustrated at its anniversary event in Helsinki which included interventions from a former President and a former Secretary of State from the United States. It is also illustrated by CMI's ability to arrange meetings at the highest level of the civil service in countries as diverse as Qatar or Germany. Its outreach is readily accepted by external stakeholders such as the Kremlin or European Union institutions and CMI staff or partners are actively engaged in the design and delivery of peace activities. It appears that there are only a few European organisations which could claim expertise at a similar level, backed by national political and diplomatic resources. None could enjoy the continuity of funding and commitment which is afforded by the relatively flexible funding allocations from the Finnish MFA.

Both in the case of the Moldova-Transdniestria conflict and in its activities to empower women in conflict resolution, CMI is able to reach and work with key decision makers. Its own strategy is flexible, responding to new requests as they emerge (for example local ceasefires in Yemen and local level reconciliation efforts in Libya recently) and emphasises the search for local solutions. This effectively empowers the local teams to implement activities with a high degree of decentralisation. The reporting and risk management then ensures that these activities remain in line with the organisation's comparative advantage.

### **Responsiveness to the rights and priorities of stakeholders and beneficiaries in partner countries**

CMI's vision that "all conflicts can be resolved" is rooted in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that everyone has a right to peace. The societal and state development undertaken by CMI strengthens the protection and fulfilment of human rights. In its work CMI engages both duty bearers and rights holders: governments responsible for delivering human security and civil society which can advocate for and monitor this delivery independently.

CMI emphasises in interviews and in the oral guidance provided to its staff, fully in line with a human rights based approach, that while the legal and political obligation of implementing human rights always lies with the state, CMI's work with international and regional organisations supports their fundamental role in advocating and enabling good practices within their areas of influence.

**CMI is able to reach and work with key decision makers. Its own strategy is flexible, responding to new requests as they emerge and emphasises the search for local solutions.**

Although CMI, seeks to operate with high level decision makers, the programming is also highly responsive to the needs of the weaker stakeholders - whether the marginalised leadership of the Gagauz, a minority group in Moldova, or women in conflict resolution. CMI often quotes UN data which show that in the last 15 years less than 2% peace agreements were signed by women; less than 9% of negotiators were women; in addition, 50% of peace agreements fail in their first decade and inclusive approaches are shown to be linked to better quality and sustainability in peace processes.

The nature of peace processes would not allow for an equal emphasis on all stakeholders, such as children, who are not empowered actors within peace processes (even though they may be important constituencies in public campaigns, which is not the nature of CMI's work). It can however be said that all conflict relates to a form of exclusion, and CMI's approach is accordingly inclusive. The most fundamental human rights are violated in conflict and the work of CMI in reducing conflict addresses these rights, even though the organisation does not use a Human Rights Based Approach. Rather CMI seeks to engage above all with duty bearers on the terms of inclusive and negotiated peace agreements which meet the requirements of justice and international norms.

The evaluation analysed the internal reviews of CMI's engagement in Afghanistan, Palestine and Kyrgyzstan. The design and delivery of the activities are, above all, guided by the principle of identifying the key entry points after a demand has been made by a senior actor (on occasion a Finnish political figure), managing the entry and relationships, and formulating solutions that are accepted by all. The content of these solutions is aligned to human rights, whether it be transparency about the events in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the representativeness of civil society in Palestine, or inter-ethnic dialogue in northern Afghanistan.

In dialogue processes as illustrated in its gender and Moldova programme CMI ensures balanced participation among different factors such as gender, age, geographical, political, religious and ethnic backgrounds. This is promoted as an approach throughout the literature and is a key element of the Theory of Change. In the capacity building processes, CMI promotes inclusiveness by providing tools and arenas for participatory engagement, and stressing the value of politically inclusive settlements. Some projects focus specifically on group participation: for example youth dialogue in South Caucasus, the women's network in Yemen or strengthening civil society actors' participation through public consultations in Palestine.

### **Coherence with national policies and strategies in the partner countries**

The core of the approach of CMI is inclusion. As such it is able to enlarge the circle of decision making, addressing imbalances as a way of encouraging the resolution of conflict. This is done, in the case of the gender programme, through the provision of expertise which has until now been lacking. In Moldova there is a very strict observance of the notion of neutrality and respect for confidentiality, which is a prerequisite for operating in this environment.

Because CMI only operates in response to the demand of the parties to a conflict, in a consensual and persuasive mode, it is naturally aligned with the perceived interests of those parties. At the same time CMI operates systematically in relation to international and national policies, inasmuch as these policies are clearly formulated in relation to conflict (which is admittedly not often, since at a formal level that the existence of conflict is necessarily in opposition to national policies). For example, the African Union Commission Peace and Security Department has a policy to address issues concerning gender, women, peace and security as part of its strategy and work programme through the formulation of a five-year gender peace and security programme. The process culminated in 2011 with the formulation of the AU Commission for Gender Policy 2009<sup>6</sup>.

At the same time there is no guarantee that the alignment of CMI or its partners to these policies will enjoy the support of key actors automatically. There are cases where the tactics of the groups involved may lead them to denounce their positions, as has been reported by CMI in South Sudan. There is consequently a considerable degree of informality in the work of CMI, which can militate against a systematic reference to policy alignment.

### **Alignment with Finnish development policy priorities**

Finland's 2012 Development Policy emphasised the importance of the underlying causes of stability in reference to the Arab Spring (section 1, page 28), and the application of good governance to all mechanisms of decision making. It stated that 'there is no development without security, and no security without development', going on to describe how 'comprehensive security' recommends that civil society organisations of all types be involved in peace mediation and peace building.

The document 'Finland's Development Policy and Development Cooperation for Fragile States', published in 2014, provides guidance which is directly supportive of CMI's work. It echoes the broad international consensus from previous years that development assistance needs to be 'centred on peace and state-building'. It reflects on the 'New Deal on Engagement with Fragile States' which gives priority to innovative forms of partnership to strengthen peace. The policy named three priorities: conflict prevention, participation of women, and accountable society. The first two directly, and the third indirectly, are served by CMI's work.

As Finland's development policy is an integral part of its foreign and security policy, it is only natural that CMI work to be fully aligned with it. CMI's approach is specifically designed to support Finland's goals relating to more democratic and better functioning societies, through the promotion of inclusive and peaceful societies which provide access to justice and build accountable institutions. CMI also supports the policy goals relating to the rights of

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<sup>6</sup> These policies are enshrined in the policy frameworks and structures of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 2002, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol), adopted in 2003, and the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa of 2004. Other mechanisms include the AU Action Plans on Gender Mainstreaming in peace and security, as well as a special rapporteur on women's rights, appointed in 1999, a special envoy on women, peace, and security, appointed in 2014, and the AU's Five-Year (2015-2020) Gender, Peace, and Security Programme.

women, specifically creating better opportunities to influence political decision making.

In Moldova specifically, based on interviews with foreign officials and local political representatives, the work of CMI is seen to contribute to the image of Finland: it is both a knowledgeable partner in the region, discreet and effective, and a credible diplomatic force. This is also seen in the promotion of women in peace processes, where there are arguably many more actors. The supportive role that CMI plays is more detailed and practical, as concerns for example the manner in which Security Council Resolution 1,325 on Women, Peace and Security is implemented. The continuity of funding for the project concerning the conflicts there, and the ability to work at the highest levels, for example in Brussels, Moscow, and beyond in relation to Moldova, allows CMI to extend the reach of Finnish policy.

The work on the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (a UN document elaborated in 2014) is firmly grounded in the underpinning principle that “no one will be left behind”, which naturally means that conflict has to be addressed as an underlying challenge to development. The inclusive nature of CMI’s work is fully aligned with Finland’s development philosophy.

**Conclusion:** CMI is well adjusted to conflict situations through its own capabilities, to the objectives of Finnish development policy and to the broad normative and international legal frameworks which affect its work. There is a direct alignment on a number of aspects, while also maintaining an ability to enter into relations of trust with the parties to a conflict. The un-earmarked funding received from the MFA, and the relations of trust established with all actors, are the main source of this strength. Thus, CMI is directly relevant to the policies and needs of all the actors involved in its field of operations.

The harmony with which CMI is able to operate within international norms and instruments, and the particularities of local conflicts, should be preserved. CMI’s relationship with MFA is an important element of this ability to align and blend into difficult situations.

**Recommendation 1, for the MFA:** The alignment within which CMI is able to operate, between international norms and instruments, and the particularities of local conflicts, should be preserved. The MFA programme-based support is in this sense an important element of this ability to align and blend in. The relative autonomy and trust given to CMI in the formulation of the projects should be maintained.

## 4.2 Efficiency

### Outputs and value from the perspective of policy, programme and beneficiaries

The outputs of the projects reviewed are highly distinct, reflecting CMI’s ability to adapt to local situations. While for the gender programme these are work-

**The vast majority of beneficiaries interviewed found the combination of official and unofficial actors, practitioners and academia successful.**

shops, training and participation in events internationally, in Moldova they revolve around the creation of an active and connected, but informal, Group of Experts.

At policy level the contributions are substantive as they shape the content of policy making and address some of the factors behind the risk of conflict. The High-Level Seminars on Gender and Inclusive Mediation have increased awareness and capacities among key international and regional peace mediators by encouraging attitude change, increasing practical capacities and enabling platforms to exchange views on ensuring women's meaningful participation in peace processes. In 2013-2015, CMI, the UN Department of Political Affairs and Peace Research Institute of Oslo implemented a series of seminars (two pilots in 2013 and six seminars in 2013-2015), involving 164 persons of which 45% were women, including several UN Special Representatives and key advisors. It is interesting to note here the level of people targeted: senior management and experts. For example at the highest level, the seminars attracted 10 Special Representatives of the Secretary General of the UN and envoys (in office) from the UN. In 2015 seminars were organised in Oslo and Helsinki.

The vast majority of beneficiaries interviewed found the combination of official and unofficial actors, practitioners and academia successful - an approach clearly at the core of CMI's added value - and feel that their capacities in practising inclusion have increased. It is difficult to monitor long term outcomes, but since the targeted participants are key mediators from international and regional organisations, one could logically argue (on the basis of the continuity in personnel that are present in these international processes) that their increased capacities on gender and inclusion will contribute to the processes in which they are involved. For CMI the seminars have also provided openings to engage with new people and organisations. This familiarity is important.

However some scepticism has been expressed by participants about the content of the training. Interviews indicate that there is a possibility that allowing participants to self-select the events has not effectively excluded those who may be sceptical. An internal evaluation conducted by CMI states that "the DPA position throughout has however been that the curriculum is fixed and cannot be changed. This has resulted in a narrower role for CMI and PRIO than what was assumed originally." The evidence collected independently confirmed that CMI has acted in a junior capacity, deferring to the UNDPA personnel, whose approach was too controlling to allow the high level participants to truly capitalise on their knowledge, and advance to their full potential.

### **Utilisation of financial and human resources**

The financial resources of the projects are reported every four months, and there is a constant effort to maximize the utilization of time and human capital. It is not possible to conduct a cost-benefit analysis in any sense as the costs are related primarily to personnel whose value is not quantifiable. For example each individual profile brings with it significant relationships.

The good ratio of financial resources to outputs can be inferred from the use of consultants who are employed on a part time basis to run projects and significant relationships. This is the case for example in Yemen, where the key person

is also involved in other organizations and his ability to achieve outcomes is directly linked to the credibility gained from his other roles in the country.

The financial controls of CMI have not been tested as part of this evaluation, but Big Four auditors have reported positively on the management of risks, in particular corruption (which is reflected in the risk monitoring). In a manner inherent to all relatively small organizations, CMI is able to account overall for the outputs in a way which is correlated with its use of resources. This was considerably tightened in the last quarter of 2015, when the 38% MFA budget cuts were announced, equaling some 23% of the entire CMI budget.

## Management and M&E

CMI has recruited highly trained individuals for communications, finance and M&E from leading organisations in their fields and invested substantially in the systems that they have recommended in recent years. This touches on rigorous financial control and reporting. There has been a continuous effort to ensure that the tools are directly useable by ‘frontline’ personnel, as for example when the reduction in the CMI budget led to the disbandment of the Programme Development and Coordination team and the Methods and Tools team. The fluidity of the local situation, and the sensitivity of the issues, forces constant adaptation at project level.

However, this bottom up accountability does not seem to entail a similar top-down flow of information as interviews reveal that field personnel have a low awareness of their budgets and level of expenditure. This would seem to indicate that in this area there is more centralisation in CMI than there is in the actual technical delivery of the activities, which is decentralised. This may be reconciled at the level of the Project Manager, who is responsible for both highly political processes and complex financial management. These qualities are often hard to reconcile in a single person.

There are however indications that CMI is over-engineering its reporting (in that it has too many overlapping and complicated systems). This evaluation encountered a substantial evolution in the use of planning frameworks across all the projects, some of which are still used for the projects, but decreasingly for the organisation as a whole. There are now also multiple layers of outputs, types of outcomes, risk assessments, assessments against multipliers, project reports, and narrative reports. CMI has various types of reports from the projects, tri-annually and annually: narrative (substance), risks and finance. These are collated and analysed centrally by specifically tasked teams (Programme Management Office, and Finance and Administration). However, these include many forms of analysis which do not relate well to the theory of change and the evolution of the risk processes. The polycentric nature of reporting is apt to deal with complexity, but there is a risk that perfection may actually mean leaner reporting.

MFA is also less advanced along this route to better reporting outside the linearity that dominates in Results-Based Management, and this linear paradigm may also contribute to greater complications. In order to present a potential donor or political incumbent with a clear and persuasive argument as to why a particular peacebuilding intervention deserves their support, those responsi-

**Bottom up accountability does not seem to entail a similar top-down flow of information as interviews reveal that field personnel have a low awareness of their budgets and level of expenditure.**

ble for the design need to simplify complex political and social change processes into straight forward linear causal frameworks. The linear causal assumptions underpinning these reductionist frameworks are increasingly packaged in neat, single-sentence ‘theories of change’ to make it easier for the funding agency to understand what they are supporting and why.

This mainstream practice provides evaluators with a specific set of causal assumptions to analyse. Peacebuilding interventions that deal with mediation are extremely complex and unpredictable, and may achieve some of their intended effects, but they will also have side-effects: some of which may have been anticipated and steps may have been taken to mitigate those effects. However, when an organisation such as CMI attempts to influence complex systems it also stimulates unintended consequences, some of which may cause harm. When intervening in a complex system it is not possible to only affect one variable. M&E systems that only look into whether the intended results have been achieved will thus miss other important effects that such a programme will have had. Such an evaluation may also be blind to other influences that may have contributed to the intended results being achieved or not. Evaluation methodologies designed for complicated systems will thus be poorly suited for analysing complex system effects. It should come as no surprise therefore that most evaluations of peacebuilding projects still follow a remarkably similar logic.

The problem with predominant linear analysis is that while linear causal logic is well suited for complicated systems such as development projects, it is less adequate for examining the highly dynamic and complex social systems that peacebuilding interventions are attempting to influence. It is this mismatch, and the inherent tensions that it generates in peacebuilding practice, and especially evaluations, that is the focus of the current effort in M&E within CMI, and which could lead to much needed simplification and greater oversight as well as insight.

### **Risk Management and Identification of Alternative Approaches**

The risk management processes of CMI during the period 2010-2015, alluded to in Section 2.3, are the framework within which active reporting takes place. It is a model which other CSOs working in high risk environments could emulate. The past experience of the evaluators has not identified any an NGO that has reached such a level of formal risk monitoring.

The highly adaptive and cost-conscious approach of CMI in Moldova makes any judgement as regards the existence of alternative approaches difficult. The evaluator was not able to identify instances of waste or even excessive spending. For the project ‘Supporting a Stronger Role for Women’, the responsibility for approaching and inviting participants and developing the curriculum was with UNDP and the logistics and the substance of the seminar was in the hands of CMI. Looking at the complex procedures UN has to follow for travel arrangements, this arrangement made appropriate use of the complementarity of the two organisations.

In the case of Moldova, the dispersed nature of the team (operating in Saint Petersburg, Brussels, Chisinau, with partners across the region) is matched by the very light nature of the Group of Experts. At the same time personal styles,



which are important for this work, tend to dominate. There is a light confusion of roles in terms of the distinctions between Project Advisors and Project Managers, Project Officers and Project Assistants. The job descriptions given orally by some overlap with others, and highly dynamic thinking is clearly taking place in different parts at the same time. It should be noted however that this has not resulted in any damage to performance, and to reduced effectiveness, as will be seen in the following section.

**Conclusions:** The outputs are valued by partners and represent a key contribution to highly dynamic situations in 13 areas around the world, for a relatively modest annual budget. The evaluation considered whether a greater concentration of activities could be achieved, with the possible gain that fewer countries would have more resources which would lead to more impact. In the case of CMI this would be at best a weak correlation as the impact is not necessarily related to the scale of resources. Moreover in 2015 CMI reduced the number of countries in which it intervenes in a process that entailed a good analysis of depth versus spread, leading the evaluator to conclude that the current number is appropriate.

Although, overall CMI is considered to be effective in the contexts in which it operates, there are several issues that require attention:

CMI has difficulty in hiring staff who are highly specialised in conflict resolution and are also good at resource management.

CMI should introduce systems to ensure that the accountability of the field staff is matched by a top-down flow of information so that field staff members are appropriately informed. While generally of a high standard, there are indications that CMI is over-engineering its reporting in that it has too many overlapping and complicated systems which sometimes lead to an inadequate flow of information. A significant challenge lies in the nature to M&E, which, as it is currently formulated, gives too much priority to linear planning based on hindsight, to the detriment of an insightful approach to complexity in conflicts.

**Recommendation 2:** The competency frameworks and job descriptions of staff should be better aligned, and ways should be found to ensure that some focal points within project activities are fully empowered to manage resources, while others are more outward oriented to deal with conflict situations.

**Recommendation 3:** CMI's current effort to focus more on the context in the current M&E system should be continued, with an emphasis given to multipliers and the way in which specific projects relate to the context multipliers that are amenable to influence.

## 4.3 Effectiveness

### Outcomes of the CSO programme (intended and un-intended) and value from the perspective of the policy, CSO programmes and beneficiaries

The nature of outcomes in CMI's work is very diverse and highlights the scale of the challenges faced in M&E: for example, the utilization of the skills which being promoted by the gender project and the utilization of expertise and contacts emanating from the Group of Experts in Moldova. The right hand column of the Logical Framework presented in Table 2 illustrates this diversity and the difficulty of verification. This evaluation has captured challenging aspects for the two projects, as shown in Table 3.

**Table 3:** Achievements in terms of outcomes

Intended Outcome	Verified Outcome	Unintended Outcome
Use CMI's position as one of the main private diplomacy actors in peacemaking to enable cross-fertilization between the NGO and institutional actors on how to put the 'gender peace and security' agenda into play in the best interests of peace processes. The project also stresses a 'cutting edge' aspect of trying to bring new thinking and approaches to an area that many practitioners have seen as 'difficult' and driven more by values and norms than by political imperatives.	CMI has been able to access high level decision makers in multilateral organizations and negotiation teams to propose highly practical ways of including women. The contribution by CMI is only one part of the whole, but highlights the diverse effects which women can have, and this insight is being used instead of a purely normative approach which risks falling into a caricature of quantitative measures of participation.	CMI is able to relate to other leading actors behind Security Council Resolution 1325 from the Nordic countries. This gives Finland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs a seat at the table of those driving change in this area, but with a nuanced and informed message. It also affords CMI some highly prized relations to key actors in the African and multilateral arena.
Organize senior track 1.5 and 2 actors to create a structured support mechanism able to engage with key political stakeholders and complement the official Transnistrian settlement process. Key political actors include the negotiators from Chisinau and Tiraspol, the mediators and observers from the OSCE, Ukraine, Russia, EU and the USA, as well as participants in the official Working Groups focused on CBMs in Moldova-Transnistria.	A stable and well connected group of specialists from all the important types of background are continually interacting and producing evidence on the solutions which could be used to resolve the conflict. This Group has become available for a new and unforeseen initiative organized by Germany under the auspices of the OSCE.	Finland is perceived by all actors as a predictable and neutral actor in a conflict which connects the European Union and Eurasia, and has broader implications in terms of NATO security, Ukraine, and the grey economy. Even though there is no Finnish diplomatic representation the work of CMI is clearly considered as a Finnish contribution with a highly strategic focus on the creation of channels of communication at the international level, as political will at the local level is more in favour of the status quo.

The stakeholders interviewed have all expressed positive assessments of the value of the outcomes. There is a clear sense that CMI is providing a unique and highly needed contribution to the right individuals. While in some cases there could be improvements in the delivery of the activities (for example fewer presentations and more dialogue in the training provided with DPA), there is no doubting the importance of inclusive gender approaches as women are, to quote one respondent, central to the existence of the armed groups in the Central African Republic and consequently are at great risk.

## **Internal or external factors that influence the successes and challenges**

The dominance of external factors on the success of the initiatives taken by CMI is high. In the case of Moldova, for example, a shift in the foreign policy of certain European countries in relation to Ukraine and to Eastern Europe, which was not anticipated by all actors, has triggered significant progress in early 2016 in the negotiations. A similar shift is also occurring in the adjacent project relating to Gagauzia.

On the other hand CMI has deliberately framed its approach to be able to take advantage of these changes, and to insulate its programmes from being undermined. Its emphasis on relations and on the highly mobile and versatile provision of expertise and its ability to call on high level support, have enabled it to mitigate negative effects. It was CMI which, through its European contacts, was able to identify and relate to the shift in European policy in relation to Moldova, and introduced the Group of Experts to it. The cohesiveness of the Group can itself be considered an outcome, and their exposure to this new dynamic in the negotiation creates a unique opportunity. This has been carefully prepared by CMI. For example the staff explained that while they were initially sceptical about the study tours organised for stakeholders, they found them to be crucial in shifting the nature of relations among them. The Group itself is able to provide highly specialised analysis in a very short time frame, a capability which external observers appreciate.

## **Extent to which the CMI programme builds the capacity of partner CSOs, or partner countries**

CMI is very loyal to its partners. In practically all the cases surveyed, CMI has developed multi-year support them. At the same time however, the conceptualisation of these relationships is quite different: for CMI it is seen as an entry point into the mediation and facilitation of peace processes. The development of capacity may be done through formal training, but most of the support is provided 'on the job'.

A specific aspect of CMI's contribution is visible in the way that its own tools and concepts are adopted by other organisations. Senior management has for example quoted the use of forecasting software which is now being used by former personnel on a commercial basis, personnel who had to be laid off at the time of the budget cuts in 2015, following a good neighbour agreement with CMI. Similarly the expertise of the Group of Experts has been directly co-opted by one of the OSCE member states to provide it with the analytical capacity which it previously lacked. In many other cases, such as in South Sudan, the parties have directly continued the approaches put forward by CMI, while not necessarily acknowledging the fact.

The CSOs with which CMI works are often informal and temporary as conflict situations are not conducive to institutional stability. Additionally the personnel who pass through these organisations are more important to CMI than the partner structures themselves; as it is these individuals who create relations and know-how which is valuable to a particular peace process. This is a consequence of the 'peace process-centric' nature of CMI's work. The benefits

**The CSOs with which CMI works are often informal and temporary as conflict situations are not conducive to institutional stability. Additionally the personnel who pass through these organisations are more important to CMI than the partner structures themselves.**

accruing from working with CMI are positively described by personnel working in these organisations. These include subject matter expertise, the opening of unexpected contacts, the provision of long running and relatively undetermined support in relation to a particular peace process, and above all the ability to provide on-the-ground and timely support.

**Conclusion:** The intended outcomes achieved by the programme align clearly with the outcomes as originally intended. There are however a significant unintended outcomes, which enhance the true value of CMI as a policy actor. It is through its ability to adapt that CMI is able to generate knowledge which is prized by external partners, and establish relationships which have more longevity than institutional links and enhance its influence.

**Recommendation 4:** CMI should preserve its adaptive management style to establish more systematic and rapid feedback loops, using more qualitative and real-time aspects of monitoring, and giving due importance to unintended effects.

## 4.4 Impact

### Evidence or signs of impact (positive or negative, intended or unintended)

The paradox inherent in the evaluation of peacebuilding is that any form of evidence of impact which is based on indicators and planning forecasts is often highly contested. This is visible in the Logical Framework developed for this evaluation, where higher level change can be attributed to a number of non-CMI factors. At the same time observations show that there is a very clear causal link between the work of CMI and the possibility of progress in a given conflict.

In the case of Moldova it is the (unintended) availability of the Group of Experts which allowed the German chairmanship of the OSCE working group to make new proposals. These have the potential to unlock the talks on Transdniestria as there is a renewed sense of credibility in the talks, and the possibility for Russia to play a mediation role, rather than be depicted as one party to the conflict. The evaluation found that there is in both Moldova and in Transdniestria a willingness to countenance the status quo, motivated in great part by the existence of very real but informal business interests tied to cross-border smuggling into Ukraine. The main drivers of change are in this sense situated outside the immediate geography. It is precisely on this level that CMI has carried out its work in 2015-2016. There are clear indications that a change of political will, triggered by the access of decision makers to CMI expertise, will lead to changes in the internal Moldovan dynamics.

It is however not difficult to see that there is real potential for CMI to better capture this type of impact by adopting a less formally predictive analytical framework. The evaluation concludes that the emphasis given in current M&E thinking to hindsight and oversight has been at the price of insight and foresight. The Results -Based Management processes have been clear concerning

the intended changes and the evidence indicating the reality of these changes. The unpredictable development of complexity in conflict makes this less important than actually understanding the optimal outcomes and impact of a peace process. This is particularly true today when mass transport and digital communication accelerate the capacity of actors situated outside the immediate negotiations to suddenly acquire a preponderant influence, and to multiply the factors of success.

**Conclusion:** Even though there are clear narratives of impact, occasionally of a confidential nature, more could be done by CMI to develop appropriate tools to capture impact. At the same time this will require a very significant dialogue with the architects of RBM within the MFA. The parallel assessment on RBM in this evaluation concludes that, in the case of CMI, much greater emphasis should be given to the process of M&E than to the actual products. At the same time the evaluation concludes, on the basis of interviews conducted with a wide range of stakeholders and on the basis of and analysis of the evolution of the situation in Moldova that CMI is able to create changes that are a positive contribution to conflict resolution, changes which would not have occurred without it. This is a significant impact.

**Recommendation 5:** The M&E system of CMI needs to be more strategic and grounded in the context. This can be done by better developing the conceptualisation and identification of the multipliers (or decisive conditions, or drivers) of change, and understand how the projects are affecting, or not, these drivers. There should be less emphasis on the planned/unplanned, or intended/Unintended dichotomy, and less definition of the end states, but also more emphasis on real-time reporting and the capture of knowledge about the context, and anticipation of its upcoming evolution.

## 4.5 Sustainability

### Partner ownership of the projects

CMI is essentially working to empower the direct beneficiary groups. There is no attempt to work with the actual partners in a way which becomes durable, other than through capacity building at certain points in time and in relation to the opportunities such relationships create. The CMI project teams are however always playing a close and highly supportive role. This makes the approach strong on local ownership, across all the activities observed by the evaluation.

In the case of the Moldova conflict this is characterised by a focus on the Expert Group, which itself becomes an actor in the peace processes, even if this is done informally. The Group is fully aware of its own role and of its ability to self-regulate supported by CMI. Similarly, as in the negotiations in Libya, CMI is able to translate new guidance generated by the United Nations Environment Programme on mediation around conflict on natural resources, in a way which proposes frameworks of understanding to the key parties to the conflict. This

**By keeping its structures light and mobile, CMI is able to concentrate its resources on capacity building, which is the one most consistent form of activity which it undertakes across its projects.**

emphasises the unifying nature of natural resources, where all parties find a common interest in protecting their future access to wealth. The tools are used in such a way that they do not appear foreign to the parties in the conflict.

There is at the same time a priority given to affecting the status and influence of a particular actor. The beneficiaries of CMI's support are carefully chosen through informal stakeholder analysis. The approach is determined by the dynamics of a particular conflict, but is in fact a variable which CMI seeks to influence itself. In this sense the stakeholder targeting is selective and focused, and does not lead to the kind of lasting empowerment witnessed in other Finnish CSOs which work in development. The outcome, which is the exercise of ownership, is temporary, and not necessarily related to sustainability.

### **Organisational, social, cultural sustainability of the projects**

The ability of CMI to blend in is underscored by the recruitment of its personnel, with wide ranging linguistic and educational backgrounds. By keeping its structures light and mobile, CMI is able to concentrate its resources on capacity building, which is the one most consistent form of activity which it undertakes across its projects: this is visible of course in its gender work, but also in the study visits in Moldova, the workshops on natural resource management in Libya, the dialogue activities in Armenia. It extends far beyond formal training and covers 'on site' joint thinking, such as that done through its Foresight tools for planning.

There is however a considerable overhang from the dependence of CMI on public financing, particularly from MFA. The recent shifts in funding in Helsinki have forced difficult choices; for example abandoning programmes in Liberia. There is some evidence that the groups that CMI supports through its projects would continue to be supported should the funding allocations change, particularly as regards the gender training of multilateral actors.

The proportion of CMI's total funding sourced from the private sector increased from 2% in 2014 to 5% in 2015 (excluding funding from foundations). There are possibilities of relating CMI's to the commercial outcomes which would be valued by private companies. This is currently illustrated in terms of the communication potential of CMI for a particular organisation (for example in the case of the current headquarters which are rented at preferential rates by a commercial pension fund).

At the same time greater international diversification of public funding could weaken the independence and pragmatic programming afforded by MFA funding. The evidence of funding from other public sources in Moldova indicates that many donors are more insistent on earmarking their funds, and influencing delivery, than MFA is. There is a clear sense, in public events held by CMI (for example its recent 15th anniversary seminar) that global geopolitical forces would be happy to claim CMI's influence for their own ends.

The lightness of CMI's contributions to peace processes reverses the traditional problem of exit strategies in development assistance. While the benefits created are essentially intangible and owned by the local counterparts and partners, there is little to determine the nature of a CMI exit. The diversity of contexts

and the autonomy of partners mean that CMI is not the sole contributor, nor the most indispensable one, even in low resource situations such as Moldova. CMI staff members argue correctly that the exit strategy is entirely predicated on the resolution of the conflict and on the enlightened interests of the parties in achieving peace.

**Conclusion:** The actor-driven nature of CMI's engagement in conflict mediation, and the strong focus on expertise, both in terms of subject matter and country situations, is important. At the same time the transient nature of institutions in conflict precludes a focus on the institution, and encourages a focus on relationships. The consequence is that little importance is given to sustainable institutions. However, a degree of sustainability is built in to the system as CMI approach is strong on local ownership.

Although little of CMI's funding is sourced from the private sector, there may be scope for CMI to increase private sector funding.

The evidence of funding from other public sources indicates that many donors are more insistent on earmarking their funds and influencing delivery, than MFA is.

CMI's exit strategy is entirely predicated on the resolution of the conflict and on the enlightened interests of the parties in achieving peace.

**Recommendation 6:** The independence and particularities of the organisation need to be preserved, and this does not automatically occur if one uses development aid instruments. This independence should not be threatened by a reduction in funding which would threaten the organisation's independence. There is an alternative to continued public grants, which lies in the MFA leveraging its resources to mobilise private capital. The area of impact investment offers significant opportunities.

## 4.6 Complementarity, Coordination and Coherence

### Communication and coordination with other CSOs, donors and other development partners

The level of CMI's coordination and communication is good. While the Communication team indicates that most of the material produced by the organisation is tailored to a Finnish audience, there is ample evidence that key partners internationally are well informed of the initiatives.

The informal and often confidential nature of peace brokering requires that for much of CMI's work information cannot necessarily be shared widely. There is no evidence however to show that CMI did not inform individuals or organisations whom it should have informed, beyond the normal complaints which may emerge in the normal course of power politics.

CMI occupies a unique role within Finnish foreign policy and public image. The very perception of Finland as a constructive, enduring and low profile partner

**The informal and often confidential nature of peace brokering requires that for much of CMI's work information cannot necessarily be shared widely.**

serves CMI, and is served by CMI. The ability of the organisation to reach out to important parties in a conflict is predicated on its solid international track records well as on political leadership and the continued engagement of MFA and.

By the very political nature of its work, CMI operates separately but alongside other organisations: cooperating both inside and outside MFA supported programmes with other CSOs from Finland and elsewhere, through:

- permanent coordination of all 22 partnership CSOs in Finland
- cooperation through development CSOs umbrella organisations Keka and Kehys in Finland
- EU-funded consortium in the South Caucasus
- A consortium of international CSOs to provide EU's External Action Service short term capacities in mediation
- EU-funded consortium of international CSOs to support Economic Commission Of West African States' capacities in mediation

Additionally, CMI is negotiating with several other Finnish CSOs participation in two EU trust fund applications for Syria and Libya.

The small international constituency in Finland however means that there is a reasonable degree of coordination and complementarity. This was for example observed in the case of Liberia, where local knowledge was provided by the Finnish Refugee Council.

The ability of the projects to lean on multilateral instruments is remarkable. The use of UN Secretariat capabilities to deliver training on gender is matched by the use in Libya of the UNEP handbook on natural resources and conflict which was recently launched, with MFA funding. CMI operates directly in symbiosis with the multilateral instruments of Finnish foreign policy.

The coherence with Finnish policy objectives is complete. This goes beyond the relevance noted in section 3.1 and also extends to the implementation of activities that give life to the general principles noted in the New Deal on Engagement with Fragile States and its 'Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals': legitimate and inclusive politics (CMI allows peace processes to become broader and deeper), and security and justice (most notably by creating new forms of CSO engagement). The coherence is further extended by the ability of CMI to apply these principles to countries where there is no Embassy (for example Moldova or Yemen) and creating new synergies (for example women, multilateralism, and natural resources).



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**Conclusion:** The importance of coherence, coordination and complementarity are well understood by CMI: creating the room for manoeuvre which is required to be effective and to fulfil its mandates. CMI's activities complement those of the other organisations with which CMI coordinates. CMI's coherence with Finnish policy objectives is complete.

**Recommendation 7:** CMI should separate the requirements of confidentiality from its public communication. Within the M&E system, CMI should ensure a closer examination of ways of separating but still capturing the sensitive information essential for effective implementation. One way to do that is to develop a scoring system where the overall score allows for an overview of performance, but the evidence base for this scoring is only accessible to a limited number of personnel mandated to assess the accuracy and materiality of the reporting.

**CMI is consistently intervening as a negotiator, in a way which enhances Finnish foreign policy instruments.**

## 5 LESSONS LEARNT

### **CMI operates as a learning organisation**

CMI offers a tightly woven and highly strategic instrument to the MFA, to intervene in a sensitive and locally driven manner. Its results are not easy to capture and communicate, but the organisation is making considerable efforts in this area.

### **A good understanding of the foundations of its credibility and legitimacy**

While the achievement of specific outputs may be contingent on the evolution of a particular situation, CMI is consistently adopting a capacity building role, or even intervening as a negotiator, in a way which enhances Finnish foreign policy instruments. Its mandate is organised in different ways, but always so that it is a legitimate and fully involved partner:

- Mediation and dialogue where the mandate is given by the parties to the conflict.
- Mediation support where the mandate is given through multilateral frameworks.
- Support to states and societies in conflict prevention and resolution where the mandate emanates from the country authorities.

### **The resource base is challenging**

With what is a relatively small financial contribution (7 million Euros approximately per year recently) the organisation is able to play a significant role in some ten to fifteen conflicts around the world every year, drawing on and extending Finland's pool of international contacts and national expertise. The evaluation has been able to confirm the role played by its contributions.

The challenge for this unique profile is to be found in the current dependence on public sources of funding, and on the inability to convey its impact in simple and verifiable terms. The current state of affairs will not prejudice the quality of work. There is however a need to further grasp and explain the nature of CMI's impact, and to increase the financial sustainability of its funding.

CMI's experience highlights the need for flexible funding sources for conflict resolution free from political or commercial interference.

In conflict resolution, project design needs to be flexible and reactive to enable a rapid response to rapidly evolving operating environments.

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# THE EVALUATION TEAM

**Emery Brusset** specialises in evaluations of social development interventions and impact investment, with a focus on complex environments - either fast moving, or conflictual. After a brief career in UN humanitarian missions in Iraq, Bosnia, Sudan and Rwanda. Mr Brusset became an independent evaluation consultant in 1994, working for Governments, the UN and NGOs, and progressively developing social assessments for the private sector (primarily oil and gas, mining, and consumer goods). He has participated in 81 evaluation assignments, has published on the subject in peer reviewed publications, and facilitated many training courses. He established Channel Research in 1998. He is now the Director of Social Terrain, supporting projects that demonstrate both a social impact and a financial return. Mr Brusset is a French national and a graduate of Yale University and the London School of Economics.

**Bill Sterland** is dedicated to the strengthening of civil society as a driver of positive social change and more peaceful societies. Working primarily with civil society organisations, he applies his expertise in process facilitation, strategic thinking, planning, and evaluation, to support organisations to strengthen themselves internally, adapt to changes in the external environment, and become more effective, with the overall aim of promoting inclusive and sustainable approaches to local economic and social development. Having initially worked in arts management (theatre) and horticulture, Bill has now been working in international development for 16 years. He has particular experience of Afghanistan and the Western Balkans. He has specialist knowledge of development and peacebuilding in fragile and post-conflict countries and of ethnically and religiously diverse societies.

**Wende Luvinga** is a project manager with over 10 years of solid experience in development cooperation gained from working with NGOs and private sector. She has broad experience in qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis and dissemination of results gained from working as a Research Assistant for projects at the University of Jyväskylä, in Finland and for the Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) in Tanzania. For the past five years, Ms. Luvinga has been working for NIRAS Finland as a Consultant, and Home-Office Coordinator for projects funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, World Bank, and Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation, and U.S. Agency for International Development.

# ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE



ULKOASIAINMINISTERIÖ  
EVA-11

TERMS OF REFERENCE EVALUATION UH2015-018499  
2.10.2015  
V 5.0

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## Evaluation of the program based support through Finnish Civil Society Organizations

### 1. BACKGROUND

Civil society actors are an essential and integral element of Finland's development cooperation in its entirety. The role of Civil Society Organizations' (CSO) - domestic, international and local in developing countries- has been increasing in Finland's development cooperation during the last years together with the total share of ODA channeled through them which was 14.6% (180 MEUR) in 2014. However due to the recent budget cuts to the Finnish Development cooperation by the government of Finland, cuts in Civil Society funding are also envisaged. The CSOs work in various thematic areas; civil society capacity building, advocacy as well as poverty reduction and public services in developing countries.

This evaluation is the first in a series of evaluations on the Civil Society Organizations receiving multi-annual programme-based support. A total of 19 organizations and 3 foundations receive this type of multiannual programme-based support and a total of appr. 80 MEUR was channeled through their programs in 2014. Each round of evaluations will include a programme evaluation on the results of selected 5-6 organizations as well as a document analysis on a specific question that will be assessed within wider group of programme-based civil society organizations.

The selected 6 organizations for this evaluation are Crisis Management Initiative, Fairtrade Finland, Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission, Finnish Refugee council, Taksvärkki (ODW Finland) and WWF Finland. The specific question that will cover all the 22 organizations, is the functioning of the results management in the organizations receiving programme-based support.

The development cooperation of the Civil Society Organizations has been part of several thematic and policy level evaluations and reviews during the recent years; the most recent, comprehensive and relevant being: Complementarity in Finland's Development Policy and Co-operation (2013) and Results on the Ground, an Independent Review of Finnish Aid (2015). The Complementarity evaluation highlighted the limited complementarity between the Finnish NGOs and other aid modalities as well as between different NGO instruments. Finnish Development policies encourage complementarity but there is no systematic coordination across program types. However the evaluation concludes that complementarity in general was supported by the MFA and most NGOs, whereas some feared that the distinction between state and civil society might become blurred.

The independent review concluded that the assessment of results in the Finnish CSO support was difficult due to lack of evaluations on results. The latest evaluation about the MFA support to Finnish foundations and Partnership agreement scheme was conducted in 2008 and the support to DEMO was evaluated in 2009 and KEPA in 2005 but very little is said about the results in any of these evaluations. The latest comprehensive evaluation on the results and impact of CSO development cooperation, funded by MFA dates back to 1994. MFA commissions regularly performance audits on the cooperation of the Partnership Scheme organizations: two organizations are audited each year, the most recent being FIDA International and Free Church Federation of Finland.

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This evaluation will include two components. Component 1 will collect data on the results of the programmes of the selected 6 organizations and assess their value and merit to different stakeholders. Component 2 will assess mainly through document analysis the functioning of the results based management mechanisms of each organization receiving programme-based support including the link between the results-based management and achieving results. The findings from the component 1 will be synthesized in Component 2. The evaluation will produce 7 reports: a separate report on each of the programme evaluations of the 6 organizations and a report synthesizing the current status of results based management in the 22 different organizations and the findings of the 6 programme evaluations from the results based management point of view.

## 2. CONTEXT

The program-based support is channeled to the partnership agreement organizations, foundations and umbrella organizations. Each category has a different background and somewhat different principles have been applied in their selection. However they have all been granted a special status in the financing application process: they receive funding and report based on a 2-4 year program proposals granted through programme application rounds which are not open to others. On the policy level however they are all guided by the same policy guidelines as the rest of the Finland's support to Civil Society Organizations.

All the civil society development cooperation is guided by the Development Policy Programme of Finland (2012) as well as guidelines for Civil Society in development policy (2010). The role and importance of civil society actors is emphasized also in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs Democracy support policy (2014). In addition to these common policy guidelines guiding the CSO funding in general and focusing on the special role of the CSOs in development cooperation, the thematic policy guidelines set the ground for specific fields that the CSOs are working in.

### **The value of Finnish Civil Society in Finland's development cooperation**

According to the guidelines for Civil Society in development policy (2010) the special value of development cooperation implemented by civil society organizations lies in the direct links it creates between the Finnish and the partner countries' civil society. These direct links are believed to be the foundation to increase Finns' awareness of conditions in developing countries and strengthen public support for all development cooperation.

Another value of the development cooperation implemented by the civil society according to the guidelines is that the activities of civil society organizations make it possible to achieve results in areas and regions and among groups of people that the resources and tools of public development cooperation do not always reach.

The special value of the Finnish civil society actors is also emphasized in building the capacity of their peers in the developing countries; the peer to peer cooperation is seen as an effective modality. Strengthening Civil society in the developing countries is one of the key priorities of Democracy support policy.

### **Results-based management in Finland's development cooperation**

The Managing and Focusing on results is one of the Aid Effectiveness principles as agreed in the context of the Paris Declaration and Busan Partnership Agreement (2005, 2011). According to the MFA Guiding Principles for Result Based Management in Finland's Development cooperation (2015), Results based management in development cooperation is simultaneously an organizational management approach, based on set principles and an approach utilizing results based tools for planning, monitoring and evaluating the performance of development projects and programs.

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The Logical Framework Approach has been widely in use as a results based programming tool in the project management of the Finnish development cooperation including CSO cooperation. In 2015 the MFA decided to start using the results chain approach in its aid instruments in the future but the process of introducing the new tool to CSO cooperation has not started.

## **The Partnership Agreement Scheme**

The origin of the Partnership Agreement Scheme lay in the framework agreement system founded in 1993. The original objectives set by the MFA for the framework agreement were to reduce administrative burden in the MFA and to improve the overall quality of projects implemented by the NGOs by ensuring financing for the most professionally operating organizations. By 2001 framework agreements were signed with a total of seven organizations: FinnChurchAid, Fida International, Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission, Finnish Red Cross, Free Church Federation of Finland, International Solidarity foundation and SASK (Trade Union Solidarity Centre of Finland). An evaluation of the framework agreement was conducted in 2002 which found little evidence that the framework agreements had contributed to either of these goals. Based on the recommendations of the evaluation the move towards program-based support with the framework NGOs took place in 2003-2004.

A New mechanism was called Partnership Agreement Scheme and a set of new criteria were set. The seven first framework organizations were directly transferred to the Partnership Scheme but a special audit was carried out of the three new entering organizations (World Vision Finland, Plan Finland and Save the Children Finland).

The Partnership Agreement Scheme was evaluated in 2008 which concluded that the new scheme had evident benefits for both MFA and the participant NGOs in terms of increased flexibility, long-term planning and reduced bureaucracy. However the objectives and rules guiding the scheme were not clear for efficient oversight by the MFA and meaningful dialogue between the partners. The evaluation recommended that the MFA should develop new management guidelines to reflect programmatic approach. The evaluation also recommended for the MFA to define clear selection criteria and to open the scheme for a limited number of new entrants to be selected in an open process.

The new instructions concerning the Partnership Agreement Scheme became operative in the beginning of 2011 and updates have been done regularly based on lessons learned in implementation. According to the current instructions, the aim of the Partnerships between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and CSOs as well as organisations' mutual collaboration is to strengthen the position of civil society and individual actors as channels of independent civilian activity in both Finland and the developing countries. Other objectives are to boost global solidarity, empower locals to exercise influence, and improve cooperation and interaction between the public authorities and civil society actors.

The selection criteria and principles were also revised and an application round was opened in 2013 and five new partnership organizations were selected: Crisis Management Initiative, Fairtrade Finland, Finnish Refugee council, Taksvärkki (ODW Finland) and WWF Finland. Fairtrade Finland started the programme from the beginning whereas the other organizations build their programmes on projects that had received project support from the MFA before entering to the partnership scheme.

The ongoing dialogue between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the partnership organisation includes annual partnership consultations, partnership forums and seminars for CSOs as well as close contacts between the CSO and the responsible official in the Unit for NGOs.

## **The Support to Foundations**

Through its NGO Foundations modality, the MFA supports three Finnish foundations that each provide small grants to NGOs in developing countries. Each foundation focuses on different issues: Abilis on

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disability, KIOS on human rights issues and Siemenpuu on environmental issues. The three foundations manage together 350 small-scale grant programs. All three foundations were established in 1998 but whereas Abilis and KIOS have been receiving MFA funding since the beginning Siemenpuu only received its first grant in 2001. Siemenpuu has received public funding also from the Ministry for Environment.

The foundations were originally established by a group of Finnish NGOs and/or civil society activists to manage small-scale flexible grants to support the development of civil society in developing countries funded by the MFA. Most of the funding to these foundations comes from the MFA but other sources of funding have emerged including other official development cooperation donors, multilateral organizations and individual donations. Since over 50% of the funding is received from the government of Finland, the foundations are required to follow the Government regulations on the use of discretionary Government transfers.

### **The Umbrella organizations**

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs grants programme-based support also to umbrella organizations KEPA (Service Centre for Development Cooperation) and Kehys (Finnish NGDO Platform to the EU). Kepa is the umbrella organisation for Finnish civil society organisations (CSOs) who work with development cooperation or are otherwise interested in global affairs. The Finnish NGDO Platform to the EU, Kehys, offers services to NGOs on EU development policy issues. KEPA and Kehys have received programme-based support from the beginning since their role as providing support, guidance and training to Finnish Civil Society organizations' working in development cooperation has been seen instrumental in improving the quality, effectiveness, impact and efficiency of development cooperation by Civil Society organizations.

### **DEMO**

The voluntary association **DEMO** (Parties' international Democracy Cooperation) was formed in 2005 and it has received since funding from different units in the MFA. In the earlier phases the democracy dialogue in Tanzania was funded through the Unit for Eastern and Western Africa at the Ministry. In 2007 the administration of the funding was transferred to the Unit for Development policy and planning to be financed from the research and institutional cooperation funds. When the administration was transferred to the Unit for Civil Society Organizations in 2012, it was decided that the programme-based support principles would be applied to DEMO with the exception that the individual project proposals would still be sent to the MFA.

## **Programmes of the selected 6 organizations for the programme evaluation:**

### **Crisis Management Initiative CMI**

CMI works to build a more peaceful world by preventing and resolving violent conflicts, and supporting sustainable peace across the globe. The CMI programme makes a contribution to sustainable development by preventing and resolving violent conflicts in 11 countries: Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Palestinian territories, South Sudan and Central African Republics.

The work is carried out in around 15 projects under three sub-programmes: i) Mediation and Dialogue, in order to enhance the prospects for existing and potential peace processes, support their effectiveness and ensure the sustainability of their results, ii) Mediation support, in order to enable states, multi-national organisations and key individuals to be better equipped to undertake and support mediation endeavours and iii) Support to states and societies in conflict prevention and resolution, in order to foster participatory design and implementation of policies and practices relevant for conflict prevention and resolution in fragile contexts. The programme supports the effective design and implementation of peace and transition processes in all of their phases. Specific emphasis is placed on women's participa-



tion and the role of gender-sensitivity in these processes. The MFA has granted 13,300,000 EUR to the implementation of the programme in 2014-2016.

### **Fairtrade Finland**

Fairtrade Finland's mission is to improve production and living conditions of small producers and workers in developing countries. The three year programme aims at achieving sustainable livelihoods for small-scale coffee producers with i) More efficient and productive small producer organizations ii) enhanced capacity of producer networks to deliver services to their members. The MFA has granted 1 800,000 euros for the implementation of the three year programme in 2014-2016.

The four projects of the programme are implemented in Central and Latin America. Coffee producer support activities will be delivered in Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Producer networks capacity will be developed in Latin America and the Caribbean.

### **Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission FELM**

The FELM Development Cooperation Programme is a six-year program (2011-2016), divided into two three-year budget periods. The second half of the program will be implemented during the years 2014-2016. In 2014, the program was implemented in 16 countries, through 50 partners and 86 projects. FELM has a long-standing partnership with the MFA through the program-based funding modality as well as the partnership scheme since the establishment of these funding instruments. Established in 1859, FELM is one of the first organizations to work in development cooperation in Finland.

The program objectives are women's and girl's empowerment, the rights of persons with disabilities, persons living with HIV and AIDS and other marginalized groups of people as well as sustainable development and climate change. This includes strengthening inter alia food security, gender equality, education and health, income generation, environment and adaptation to climate change, all for the advancement of poverty reduction and human rights. In the implementation multiple strategies are used, such as capacity building of the beneficiaries and local partners / rights-holders and duty-bearers, improving the quality of project management and implementation, raising awareness of human rights and active citizenship, strengthening networks, advocacy, and supplying financial, technical and material support. The operational principles include equality, inclusiveness and participation, local ownership, non-discrimination, transparency and accountability. During the next programme period 2017-2022, the work is tentatively planned to be implemented in 14 countries: Bolivia, Botswana, Cambodia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Laos/Thailand, Mauritania, Myanmar/Thailand, Nepal, Palestinian territories, South Africa, Senegal, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Some of the program level documents, such as annual reports are written in Finnish, others in English. Project level documents are in English, Spanish and French.

The implementing partners are national and international non-governmental organizations, churches and networks. The program consists of project work (regular and disability projects under a separate disability sub-program), emergency work, advocacy, technical support/experts and development communication and global education. In addition, capacity building, program development and evaluation are part of the overall program implementation. The MFA has granted 22,800,000 EUR (2011-2013) and 25,200,000 EUR (2014-2016) for the implementation of the program.

The work is carried out in 17 countries: Angola, Bolivia, Botswana, South Africa, Ethiopia, Cambodia, China, Colombia, Mauritania, Myanmar/Thailand, Nepal, Palestinian territories, Senegal, Tanzania, Laos/Thailand, Vietnam and Zimbabwe.

### **Finnish Refugee Council**

The development Cooperation program of Finnish Refugee Council is implemented in prolonged refugee situations and in post conflict areas. The goal is to increase equality and participation as well as to improve the realisation of human rights in selected activity areas and among target groups. The objec-

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tives of the programme are: i) the target group's ability to influence the realisation of their basic rights and prevent violent conflicts is enhanced ii) non-discrimination and equality among the target communities is increased and iii) Poverty is reduced among the target group through improved capabilities to control their own lives and increase in skills

Programme is divided in three geographical sub programmes: refugee programme in Uganda, programme for social integration in Western Africa and livelihood support programme in Mekong area. The work is carried out in 10 projects. Activities are: adult education, especially functional education including reading literacy and civic rights, community development where emphasis is on education, peace building and conflict prevention as well as supporting livelihood and capacity building of civil society organisations. The MFA has granted 6,300,000 EUR of Programme support to the Finnish refugee council for 2014-2016. The program document has been written in Finnish but the annual reports in English.

### **Taksvärkki (ODW Finland)**

In development co-operation activities, ODW's aim is to support young people's opportunities to manage their lives and develop their communities. The organizations work is founded on a rights-based approach, supporting the promotion of child and youth rights and the participation of youth within their communities. The program aims to strengthen youth-driven activities, participation and awareness and knowledge of the rights and obligations of youth. In developing countries this is done by supporting development projects of local NGOs, and in Finland through development education and information work in Finnish schools.

Collaborating partner organizations in the developing world are ODW's program partners. The programs project themes are: supporting vocational training and school attendance (Sierra Leone, Mozambique), preventive youth work (Bolivia), prevention of child labor (Cambodia), youth participation in municipal decision-making (Guatemala) and street children (Kenya and Zambia). The MFA has granted 2,700,000 EUR of Programme support to the ODW Finland for the years 2014-2016.

### **WWF Finland**

The objective of WWF Finland's international work is to ensure that the valuable natural environment in globally important areas, based on human needs and biodiversity, is conserved and valued, responsibly used and managed and equitably governed by people and governments to secure long-term social, economic and environmental benefits, in order to fulfil the rights and well-being of present and future generations.

WWF Finland programme focuses on the following work areas: a) Biodiversity conservation, b) Sustainable natural resource management, c) Good governance, d) Ecological footprint.

The work is implemented in Nepal, India, Bhutan, Tanzania, Mozambique and Indonesia. These countries are linked to regional priority programmes of the global WWF Network, which are Coastal East Africa (Tanzania and Mozambique), Heart of Borneo (Indonesia) and Living Himalayas (Nepal, Bhutan and India). The MFA has granted a total of 5,754,637 EUR to the implementation of the WWF Finland's programme during 2014-2016.

## **3. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES**

*The purpose* of the evaluation is to provide evidence based information and guidance for the next update of the guidelines for Civil Society in development policy as well as for the programme-based modality on how to 1) improve the results based management approach in the programme-based support to Civil Society for management, learning and accountability purposes and 2) how to enhance the achieving of results in the implementation of Finnish development policy at the Civil Society programme level. From

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the point of view of the development of the program-based modality, the evaluation will promote joint learning of relevant stakeholders by providing lessons learned on good practices as well as needs for improvement.

*The objectives* of the evaluation are

- to provide independent and objective evidence on the results (outcome, output and impact) of the Civil Society development cooperation programmes receiving programme-based support;
- to provide evidence on the successes and challenges of the Civil Society development cooperation programmes by assessing the value and merit of the obtained results from the perspective of MFA policy, CSO programme and beneficiary level;
- to provide evidence on the functioning of the results-based management in the organizations receiving programme support;
- to provide evidence of the successes and challenges of the programme-support funding modality from the results based management point of view.

#### 4. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The evaluation covers the programs of the 22 Finnish civil society organizations receiving programme based funding from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. The evaluation covers both financial and non-financial operations and objectives in the CSO programmes. The evaluation consists of two components. It is organized in such a way that the two components support and learn from each other. While the findings of the programme evaluations of the selected six CSOs are reported in separate reports, the findings are synthesized into the broader document analysis of the results based management of all the 22 organizations.

**Component 1** consists of programme evaluation of the 6 selected civil society organizations: Crisis Management Initiative, Fairtrade Finland, Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission, Finnish Refugee council, Taksvärkki (ODW Finland) and WWF Finland. This includes field visits to a representative sample of projects of each programme.

**Component 2** includes an assessment of the results based management chain in the 22 Finnish civil society organizations and in the management of the programme-based support in the Ministry. This includes document analysis and verifying interviews of the key informants in Helsinki to analyze the formulation processes of the programmes, overall structure of the two latest programmes, key steering processes and structures as well as accountability mechanisms to MFA and to beneficiaries.

The evaluation covers the period of 2010-2015. The guidelines for Civil Society in Development cooperation became effective in 2010 and the new instructions concerning the Partnership Agreement Scheme became operative in 2011. However, a longer period, covering the earlier development cooperation implemented by the programme support CSO's is necessary since many of the programmes and individual projects in the programmes started already before 2010 and the historical context is important to capture the results.

#### 5. THE EVALUATION QUESTION

The following questions are the main evaluation questions:

**Component 1:**

*What are the results (outputs, outcomes and impact) of the CSO programmes and what is their value and merit from the perspective of the policy, programme and beneficiary level?*

## **Component 2:**

*Do the current operational management mechanisms (programming, monitoring, managing, evaluating, reporting) in the CSOs support the achievement of results?*

*Have the policies, funding modality, guidance and instructions from the MFA laid ground for results-based management?*

The evaluation team will elaborate these main evaluation questions and develop a limited number of detailed Evaluation questions (EQs) presenting the evaluation criteria, during the evaluation Inception phase. The EQs should be based on the priorities set below and if needed the set of questions should be expanded. The EQs will be based on the OECD/DAC and EU criteria where applicable. The EQs will be finalized as part of the evaluation inception report and will be assessed and approved by the Development Evaluation Unit (EVA-11). The evaluation is also expected to apply a theory of change approach in order to contextualize the criterion for the evaluation questions.

### **The Priority issues for the Results based management chain of the CSOs:**

The guiding principles for RBM in Finland's development cooperation (2015) will form the basis for evaluating the results based management mechanisms, which will be further developed to include other issues that rise from the document analysis.

The evaluation will assess the extent to which 1) all the programme intervention areas support the overall mission of the organization and fall into the comparative advantage/special expertise of the organization 2) Clear results targets have been set to all levels (programme, country, project) 3) Credible results information is collected 4) The results information is used for learning and managing as well as accountability 5) Results-oriented culture is promoted and supported by the CSOs and by the management of the programme-based support in the MFA 6) The focus on short and long term results is balanced and the link between them is logical and credible.

### **The Priority issues of the CSO programme evaluation:**

The CSO programme evaluations will be evaluated in accordance with the OECD DAC criteria in order to get a standardized assessment of the CSO programmes that allows drawing up the synthesis. In each of the criteria human rights based approach and cross cutting objectives must be systematically integrated (see UNEG guidelines).

#### Relevance

- Assess the extent to which the development cooperation programme has been in line with the Organizations' overall strategy and comparative advantage
- Assess the extent to which the CSO program has responded the rights and priorities of the partner country stakeholders and beneficiaries, including men and women, boys and girls and especially the easily marginalized groups.
- Assess the extent to which the Program has been in line with the Finnish Development Policy priorities.

#### Impact

- Assess the value and validate any evidence or, in the absence of strong evidence, "weak signals" of impact, positive or negative, intended or unintended, the CSO programme has contributed for the beneficiaries.

### Effectiveness

- Synthesize and verify the reported outcomes (intended and un-intended) and assess their value and merit.
- Assess the factors influencing the successes and challenges

### Efficiency

- Assess the costs and utilization of financial and human resources (financial& human) against the achieved outputs
- Assess the efficiency of the management of the programme
- Assess the risk management

### Sustainability

- Assess the ownership and participation process within the CSO programme, e.g. how the participation of the partner organizations, as well as different beneficiary groups have been organized.
- Assess the organizational, social and cultural, ecological and financial sustainability

### Complementarity, Coordination and Coherence

- Assess the extent to which CSO's programme has been coordinated with other CSOs, development partners and donors.
- Synthesize and assess the extent to which the CSO programme has been able to complement (increase the effect) of other Finnish policies, funding modalities (bilateral, multilateral) and programmes by other CSOs from Finland or developing countries.

## 6. GENERAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The approach of the evaluation combines the need to obtain a general overview of the status of results-based management in the CSOs and to research in more depth, looking more closely at achieving results in the selected six CSOs' programmes. Field visits will be made to a representative sample of projects of the six CSO programmes. The sampling principles and their effect to reliability and validity of the evaluation must be elaborated separately.

Mixed methods for the analyzing of data will be used (both qualitative and quantitative) to enable triangulation in the drawing of findings. The evaluation covers both financial and non-financial operations and objectives in the CSO programmes, and the methodology should be elaborated accordingly to assess the value of both. If sampling of documents is used, the sampling principles and their effect to reliability and validity of the evaluation must be elaborated separately. A systemic analysis method will be used to analyze the data.

The Approach section of the Technical tender will present an initial workplan, including the methodology (data collection and analysis) and the evaluation matrix, which will be elaborated and finalized in the inception phase. The evaluation team is expected to construct the theory of change and propose a detailed methodology in an evaluation matrix which will be presented in the inception report.

The approach and working modality of evaluation will be participatory. During the field work particular attention will be paid to human right based approach, and to ensure that women, vulnerable and easily marginalized groups are also interviewed (See UNEG guidelines). Particular attention is also paid to the adequate length of the field visits to enable the real participation as well as sufficient collection of information also from other sources outside the immediate stakeholders (e.g. statistics and comparison material). The field work for each organizations will preferably last at least 2-3 weeks but can be done in

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parallel. Adequate amount of time should also be allocated for the interviews conducted with the stakeholders in Finland. Interview groups are to be identified by the evaluation team in advance.

Validation of all findings as well as results at the programme level must be done using multiple sources. The main document sources of information include strategy and programme documents and reports, programme/project evaluations, minutes of annual consultations, official financial decisions, Finland's Development Policy Strategies, guidance documents, previously conducted CSO and thematic evaluations and similar documents. The evaluation team is also required to use statistics and different local sources of information, especially in the context analysis, but also in the contribution analysis. It should be noted that part of the material is in Finnish.

Supportive information on all findings must be presented in the final reports. The team is encouraged to use statistical evidence where possible. Direct quotes from interviewees and stakeholders may be used in the reports, but only anonymously and when the interviewee cannot be identified from the quote. In the component 1 programme evaluations, statistical evidence and supportive information must be presented on aggregated results, where possible.

## 7. EVALUATION PROCESS, TIMELINES AND DELIVERABLES

The evaluation will tentatively start in November 2015 and end in June 2016. The evaluation consists of the following phases and will produce the respective deliverables. The process will move forward according to the phases described below. It is highlighted that a new phase is initiated only when all the deliverables of the previous phase have been approved by the Development Evaluation Unit (EVA-11). During the process particular attention should be paid to a strong inter-team coordination and information sharing within the team.

It should be noted that internationally recognized experts may be contracted by the MFA as external peer reviewer(s) for the whole evaluation process or for some phases/deliverables of the evaluation process, e.g. final and draft reports (evaluation plan, draft final and final reports). The views of the peer reviewers will be made available to the Consultant.

### 1. Start-up

**The kick off meeting and a work shop** regarding the methodology of the evaluation will be held with the contracted team in November 2015. The purpose of the kick off meeting is to go through the evaluation process and related practicalities. The work shop will be held right after the kick off meeting and its purpose is to provide the evaluation team with a general picture of the subject of the evaluation. Furthermore, the evaluation methodology and the evaluation matrix presented in the technical tender are discussed and revised during the work shop. The kick-off meeting will be organized by the EVA-11 in Helsinki.

**Participants in the kick-off meeting:** EVA-11 (responsible for inviting and chairing the session); reference group and the Team Leader, the Programme evaluation coordinators and the Home-Office coordinator of the Consultant in person. Other team members may participate.

**Venue:** MFA, Helsinki.

**Deliverable:** Agreed minutes of the kick off meeting and conclusions on the work shop.

### 2. Inception phase

The Inception phase is between November and January 2015 during which the evaluation team will produce a **final evaluation plan with a context analysis**. The context analysis includes a document analysis on the results based mechanisms as well as an analysis on the programmes of the selected six CSOs. Tentative hypotheses as well as information gaps should be identified in the evaluation plan.

The evaluation plan consists of the constructed theory of change, evaluation questions, evaluation matrix, methodology (methods for data gathering and data analysis, as well as means of verification of different data), final work plan with a timetable as well as an outline of final reports. The evaluation plan will also elaborate the sampling principles applied in the selection of the projects to be visited and the effects to reliability and validity that this may cause.

The evaluation plan will be presented, discussed and the needed changes agreed in the inception meeting in January 2015. The evaluation plan must be submitted to EVA-11 two weeks prior to the inception meeting to allow sufficient time for commenting.

**Participants to the inception meeting:** EVA-11; reference group and the Team Leader (responsible for chairing the session), the Programme evaluation Coordinators and the Home-Office coordinator of the Consultant in person. Other team members may participate via VC.

**Venue:** MFA, Helsinki.

**Deliverable:** Evaluation plan and the minutes of the inception meeting

### 3. Implementation phase

The Implementation phase will take place in January - March 2016 and it includes the field visits to a representative sample of projects and validation seminars. The MFA and embassies will not organize interviews or meetings with the stakeholders on behalf of the evaluation team, but will assist in identification of people and organizations to be included in the evaluation.

The purpose of the field visits is to reflect and validate the results and assessments of the document analysis. It should be noted that a representative of EVA-11 may participate in some of the field visits as an observer for the learning purposes.

The consultant will organize a debriefing/validation meeting at the end of each country visit. A debriefing/validation meeting of the initial findings of both components 1 and 2 will be arranged in Helsinki in March/April 2016.

The purpose of the validation seminars is to learn initial findings, but also to validate the findings. The workshops will be organized by the Consultant and they can be partly organized also through a video conference. After the field visits and validation workshops, it is likely that further interviews and document study in Finland will still be needed to complement the information collected during the earlier phases.

**Deliverables/meetings:** Debriefing/ validation workshop supported by a PowerPoint presentation on the preliminary results. At least one workshop in each of countries visited, and one joint workshop in the MFA on the initial findings of component 2 and organization specific workshops on initial findings of each programme evaluations.

**Participants to the country workshops:** The team members of the Consultant taking in the country visit (responsible for inviting and chairing the session) and the relevant stakeholders, including the Embassy of Finland and relevant representatives of the local Government.

**Participants to the MFA workshops:** EVA-11; reference group and other relevant staff/stakeholders, and the Team Leader (responsible for chairing the session) and the programme evaluation Coordinators of the Consultant (can be arranged via VC).

### 4. Reporting and dissemination phase

The Reporting and dissemination phase will produce the Final report and organize the dissemination of the results.

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The reports should be kept clear, concise and consistent. The report should contain inter alia the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations and the logic between those should be clear and based on evidence.

The final draft report will be subjected to an external peer review and a round of comments by the parties concerned. The purpose of the comments is only to correct any misunderstandings or factual errors. The time needed for commenting is 2-3 weeks.

A final learning and validation workshop with EVA-11, the reference group including the concerning CSOs will be held at the end of the commenting period. The final learning and validation workshop will be held in Helsinki and the Team Leader (responsible for chairing the session) and the Programme evaluation coordinators of the Consultant must be present in person.

The reports will be finalized based on the comments received and will be ready by **31<sup>st</sup> May 2016**. The final reports must include abstract and summary (including the table on main findings, conclusions and recommendations) in Finnish, Swedish and English. The reports will be of high and publishable quality and the translations will match with the original English version. It must be ensured that the translations use commonly used terms in development cooperation.

The reports will be delivered in Word-format (Microsoft Word 2010) with all the tables and pictures also separately in their original formats. Time needed for the commenting of the draft report(s) is two weeks. The language of all reports and possible other documents is English. The consultant is responsible for the editing, proof-reading and quality control of the content and language.

As part of reporting process, the Consultant will submit a methodological note explaining how the quality control has been addressed during the evaluation. The Consultant will also submit the EU Quality Assessment Grid as part of the final reporting.

The MFA also requires access to the evaluation team's interim evidence documents, e.g. completed matrices, although it is not expected that these should be of publishable quality. The MFA treats these documents as confidential if needed.

**Deliverables:** Final reports (draft final reports and final reports), methodological note and EU Quality Assessment Grid.

**A management meeting on the final results will be organized tentatively in the beginning of June 2016 or on the same visit than the final validation and learning workshop.**

It is expected that at least the Team leader and the coordinators of the CSO programme evaluations are present.

**A press conference** on the results of the evaluation will be organized in Helsinki tentatively in June 2016. It is expected that at least the Team leader is present.

**A public Webinar** will be organized by the EVA-11. Team leader and the coordinators of the CSO programme evaluations will give a short presentations of the findings in a public Webinar. Presentation can be delivered from distance. A sufficient Internet connection is required.

**Optional learning sessions** with the CSOs (Sessions paid separately. Requires a separate assignment by EVA-11).

The MFA will draw a management response to the recommendations at two levels/processes: the results based management report will be responded in accordance with the process of centralized evaluations and the organization reports in accordance with the process of decentralized evaluations as described in the evaluation norm of the MFA. The management response will be drawn up on the basis of discussions with the CSOs concerned. The follow up and implementation of the



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response will be integrated in the planning process of the next phase of the programme-based support.

## 8. EXPERTISE REQUIRED

There will be one **Management team**, responsible for overall planning management and coordination of the evaluation. The Team leader, the Programme evaluation coordinators and the Home officer of the Consultant will form the Management group of the evaluation Consultant, which will be representing the team in major coordination meetings and major events presenting the evaluation results.

One Team leader level expert will be identified as the **Team Leader** of the whole evaluation. The Team Leader will lead the work and will be ultimately responsible for the deliverables. The evaluation team will work under the leadership of the Team Leader who carries the final responsibility of completing the evaluation.

One senior expert level expert of each of the CSO specific programme evaluation teams will be identified as a **Programme evaluation Coordinator**. The programme evaluation coordinator will be contributing the overall planning and implementation of the whole evaluation from a CSO perspective and also responsible for coordinating, managing and authoring the specific CSO programme evaluation work and reports.

The competencies of the team members shall be complementary. All team members shall have fluency in English. It is also a requirement to have one senior team member in each programme evaluation team as well as in the management team is fluent in Finnish as a part of the documentation is available only in Finnish. Online translators cannot be used with MFA document material.

Successful conduct of the evaluation requires a deep understanding and expertise on results-based management in the context of different aid modalities but especially in civil society organizations. It also requires understanding and expertise of overall state-of-the-art international development policy and cooperation issues including programming and aid management, development cooperation modalities and players in the global scene. It also requires experience and knowledge of HRBA and cross-cutting objectives of the Finnish development policy and related evaluation issues.

Detailed team requirements are included in the Instructions to the Tenderers (ITT).

## 9. BUDGET

The evaluation will not cost more than € 450,000 (VAT excluded).

## 10. MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION

The EVA-11 will be responsible for overall management of the evaluation process. The EVA-11 will work closely with other units/departments of the Ministry and other stakeholders in Finland and abroad.

A reference group for the evaluation will be established and chaired by EVA-11. The mandate of the reference group is to provide advisory support and inputs to the evaluation, e.g. through participating in the planning of the evaluation and commenting deliverables of the consultant.

The members of the reference group may include:

- Representatives from relevant units/departments in the MFA forming a core group, that will be kept regularly informed of progress
- Representatives of relevant embassies
- Representatives of civil society organizations

The tasks of the reference group are to:

- Participate in the planning of the evaluation

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- Participate in the relevant meetings (e.g. kick-off meeting, meeting to discuss the evaluation plan, wrap-up meetings after the field visits)
  - Comment on the deliverables of the consultant (i.e. evaluation plan, draft final report, final report) with a view to ensure that the evaluation is based on factual knowledge about the subject of the evaluation

Support the implementation, dissemination and follow-up on the agreed evaluation recommendations.

## 11. MANDATE

The evaluation team is entitled and expected to discuss matters relevant to this evaluation with pertinent persons and organizations. However, it is not authorized to make any commitments on behalf of the Government of Finland. The evaluation team does not represent the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in any capacity.

All intellectual property rights to the result of the Service referred to in the Contract will be exclusive property of the Ministry, including the right to make modifications and hand over material to a third party. The Ministry may publish the end result under Creative Commons license in order to promote openness and public use of evaluation results.

## 12. AUTHORISATION

Helsinki, 2.10.2015

Jyrki Pulkkinen

Director

Development Evaluation Unit

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

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## Reference and Resource material

### DEVELOPMENT POLICY PROGRAMMES OF FINLAND

Development Policy Programme 2004

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=84297&nodeid=15457&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Development Policy Programme 2007

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=107497&nodeid=15457&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Development Policy Programme 2012

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=251855&nodeid=15457&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

### GUIDELINES AND POLICIES

Evaluation Manual of the MFA (2013)

<http://www.formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=288455&nodeid=34606&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Results based management (RBM) in Finland's Development Cooperation

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=332393&nodeid=49273&contentlan=1&culture=fi-FI>

UNEG Manual: Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluations (2014)

<http://www.uneval.org/document/detail/1616>

Guidelines for Civil Society in Development Cooperation (2010)

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=206482&nodeid=15457&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Ministry for Foreign Affairs' democracy support policy (2014)

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=311379&nodeid=15145&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

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Instructions concerning the Partnership Agreement Scheme (2013)

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=117710&GUID={FC6AEE7E-DB52-4F2E-9CB7-A54706CBF1CF}>

Thematic policies and guidelines

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=49719&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

## **EVALUATIONS AND REVIEWS**

Independent Review of Finnish Aid (2015)

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=328296&nodeid=15145&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Evaluation: Complementarity in Finland's Development Policy and Co-operation (2013)

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentId=299402&nodeId=15145&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Evaluation: Finnish NGO Foundations (2008)

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentId=161405&nodeId=49326&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Evaluation: Finnish Partnership Agreement Scheme (2008)

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentId=133140&nodeId=49326&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Evaluation of the Service Centre for Development Cooperation (KEPA) in Finland (2005)

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=71136&nodeid=49326&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Strengthening the Partnership Evaluation of FINNIDA's NGO support programme (1994)

Report of Evaluation Study 1994:1, Available only in printed version (MFA Library).

# ANNEX 2: EVALUATION MATRIX

DAC Criteria and Evaluation questions	Evaluation Sub-Question (SQ)	Indicators	Method of data collection	Source of data
<b>RELEVANCE</b> EQ 1. How relevant is the CSO programme?	1.1 Has the CSO's programme been in line with the organisations' overall strategy and is the CSO focusing on its comparative advantage?	Consistency between CSO's mission goals and goals of its development cooperation programme	Document review, interviews	Strategy documents, mission statements, programme documents, descriptions of areas of work/expertise; CSO staff
	1.2 To what extent the CSO's programme has responded to the rights and priorities of stakeholders and beneficiaries in the partner countries (including men, women, boys, girls and especially easily marginalised groups)?	Assessments of the extent to which the situation analysis and implementation processes address relevant rights and priorities. Objectives address the relevant rights of the target group (and marginalised groups if not explicitly part of rights holders).	Document review Focus group discussions (FGD), systematic interviews (some with marginalised groups)	Situation analysis documents; programme document and reports, Evaluation reports; beneficiaries and stakeholders including men, women, boys, girls and marginalised groups
	1.3 To what extent is the CSO programme coherent with national policies and strategies in the partner countries?	Correspondence with partner countries' national policies and strategies	Document review, interview	Partner countries' national policies and strategies; Partner CSOs staff
	1.4 How well is the programme aligned with Finnish development policy priorities?	Correspondence with Finnish development policy priorities. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The extent that a range of CSOs are supported in terms of geography, theme, target group, approach (pluralism).</li> <li>The extent that the support promotes active citizenship, debate and local ownership (vibrancy).</li> </ul> The extent of alignment between the ToC of CSO's programmes and the ToC of MIFA's support for CSO cooperation.	Document review	CSO's programme documentation, Finnish development policy and strategy documents

DAC Criteria and Evaluation Questions	Evaluation Sub-Question (SQ)	Indicators	Method of Data Collection	Source of Data
<b>EFFICIENCY</b> <b>EQ 2. How are the resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) converted to outputs?</b>	2.1 What are the outputs and what is their value and merit from the perspective of the policy, programme and beneficiary level?	<p>The extent that stated outputs have been achieved.</p> <p>The extent that outputs correspond with outputs of the overall ToC, namely outputs related to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advocacy efforts at country level</li> <li>• Strengthening of resource mobilisation, organizational development, governance, competence and democratic values</li> <li>• The provision of basic services</li> <li>• Communication, advocacy and education efforts in Finland.</li> </ul>	Document review, systematic interviews with the beneficiaries, other interviews	Programme strategies, reports; partner CSO staff; beneficiaries
	2.2 What are the costs and utilisation of financial and human resources against the achieved outputs?	<p>Administrative costs per standard unit (e.g., beneficiary, training costs).</p> <p>Assessment of the planning and implementation process.</p>	Document review including collection of statistical data, interviews	Programme and project documents, financial and progress reports, audit reports, partner CSOs
	2.3 How efficient is the management of the programme-based support (CSO and MFA level), including M&E?	<p>Allocation of human resources and administration in the programme; frequency of M&amp;E reports; availability of data on results; management decisions with reference to specific M&amp;E data/reports.</p>	Document review, interviews	Programme management and M&E manuals; programme progress reports, audit reports, financial reports, evaluation reports, minutes of annual meetings between the MFA and Finnish CSOs, MFA and Finnish CSO staff; documentation of management decisions
	2.4 How well have risks been identified and managed?	<p>Availability of risk assessment tools; identification of major risks and possible measures taken for handling them.</p>	Document review, interviews	Risk assessment plan, context analysis, planning documents; project management manuals
	2.5 How are the human rights principles of participation, equality and accountability embedded in the implementation of the programme?	<p>The capacity of staff to work with human rights principles is built.</p> <p>The extent that human rights principles, including gender equality, are integrated in implementation processes.</p> <p>The realisation of human rights principles is monitored and reported.</p>	Document review, systematic survey based on documents, interviews	Programme document and reports; monitoring and evaluation plans; evaluation reports; interviews with Finnish CSO and partner CSO staff; interviews with rights holders

DAC Criteria and Evaluation Questions	Evaluation Sub-Question (SQ)	Indicators	Method of Data Collection	Source of Data
<b>EFFECTIVENESS</b> <b>EQ 3. What are the outcomes of the CSOs programmes?</b>	2.6 How well were the funds utilised across various parts of the programme?	Means and resources allocated for capacity development activities (coaching, training, re-organization, strategy development, etc.) compared to those allocated to service delivery.	Document review, collection of statistical data, interviews	Progress reports, training plans and reports, training materials, Finnish CSO and partner CSO staff
	2.7 Would there have been more cost-efficient alternatives?	Assessment based on comparison with similar projects.	Document review, interviews	Project implementation plan, progress reports, interviews with implementers
	3.1 What are the outcomes of the CSO programme (intended and un-intended) and what are their value and merit from the perspective of the policy, CSO programme and beneficiary level?	Beneficiaries/right holders' assessment of change. Other stakeholder's assessment of change. Knowledge of basic rights. Cases where rights have been claimed.	Systematic document review; systematic group and individual interviews, observations	Programme document, baseline studies, Finnish CSO's monitoring reports, progress reports with information on outputs and outcomes, mid-term reviews; project management staff; beneficiaries
	3.2 What were the internal/external factors that influenced the successes and challenges?	The extent that structures and systems internal to the programme supported/hindered the attainment of results. The extent that external opportunities/threats affected the attainment of results.	Document review/analysis, interviews	Programme ToC and supporting documentation; interviews with CSO staff, partner CSO staff, beneficiaries; data on change collected by the evaluation, evaluation reports
	3.3 To what extent has the programme built the capacity of partner CSOs for delivering services or for advocacy (perceived and factual changes)	Quantity and quality of delivered services by each partner across the evaluation period. Quality of advocacy by partner CSOs across the evaluation period.	Systematic interviews, document review	Key staff from partner CSOs, stakeholders, monitoring reports, evaluation reports
3.4 Has the programme contributed to the achievement of key cross-cutting objectives including gender equality, reduction of inequalities and promotion of climate sustainability?	Change from the point of view of marginalised groups	Document review, systematic interviews	Annual programme reports, evaluation reports; beneficiaries	
3.5 To what extent has the partner country CSOs benefitted from direct links to the Finnish CSO?	Perceptions on the value provided by Finnish CSO partners.	Interviews	Partner organization's staff	

DAC Criteria and Evaluation Questions	Evaluation Sub-Question (SQ)	Indicators	Method of Data Collection	Source of Data
<p><b>IMPACT</b></p> <p><b>EQ 4. To what extent is there evidence of impact of the CSO programme in the partner countries?</b></p>	<p>4.1 What kind of evidence or signs are there of real and long lasting impact (positive or negative, intended or unintended)?</p>	<p>Evidence of likely contributions to real and long lasting change.</p>	<p>Document review, interviews, statistical data when available</p>	<p>Annual reports, progress reports of development of partner countries goals; evaluation reports; stakeholders and beneficiaries</p>
<p><b>SUSTAINABILITY</b></p> <p><b>EQ 5. How far do the stakeholders have ownership and capacity to sustain the achieved results?</b></p>	<p>5.1 To what extent do partner organizations and beneficiary groups have ownership of the project(s)?</p>	<p>The extent that partner organizations are in the drivers' seat and participate in decision processes. The extent that beneficiary groups have participated in decisions during the implementation process.</p> <p>The extent that partners take own initiatives to address problems.</p> <p>The extent that the Finnish CSO funding to partner organizations constitutes core support. The extent that partners describe programme as theirs.</p>	<p>Interviews, document review</p>	<p>Staff of Finnish CSOs and partner CSOs; stakeholders</p>
	<p>5.2 What is the organizational, social, cultural, ecological and financial sustainability of the CSOs programmes?</p>	<p>Effective use of social, cultural environmental or financial guidelines.</p> <p>The extent that organizational capacities – including management, administration and governance – have been developed.</p>	<p>Document review, context analysis, interviews</p>	<p>CSOs' strategy documents, organizational, social, cultural, ecological and financial guidelines; programme reports, project reports, evaluation reports; stakeholders and beneficiaries</p>
	<p>5.3 Has an exit strategy been developed and if so, how well is it being implemented?</p>	<p>Documentation of the implementation of an exit/sustainability strategy.</p> <p>Level of own fund raising.</p>	<p>Document review</p> <p>Interviews</p>	<p>Project documents, Final reports, Annual reports; partner CSO staff</p>



DAC Criteria and Evaluation Questions	Evaluation Sub-Question (SQ)	Indicators	Method of Data Collection	Source of Data
<b>COMPLEMENTARITY, COORDINATION AND COHERENCE</b> <b>EQ 6. How and to what extent has the programme complemented and/or coordinated with other interventions?</b>	6.1 To what extent have CSOs' programmes been communicated to and/or coordinated with other CSOs, donors and other development partners?	The extent where the exchange of information is among CSOs, donors and other development partners Cases of coordination with other CSOs and development partners.	Interviews	Local partner organization, organizations they collaborate with, Finnish Embassy and relevant donor programmes
	6.2 How and to what extent has the programme been able to complement (increase effect) of other Finnish policies, funding modalities (bilateral, multilateral) and programmes by other CSOs from Finland or developing countries.	Evidence of synergies with other Finnish interventions and/or developing country CSOs.	Interviews, document review	Local partner and Finnish Embassy; Evaluation of country strategies and country strategy modality

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# ANNEX 3: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

## FINLAND

### **Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Finland**

#### *Unit for Civil Society*

Anu Ala-Rantala, Senior Officer

#### *Unit for UN and General Global Affairs*

Janne Oksanen, Desk Officer Mediation and Women, Peace and Security

### **Crisis Management Initiative**

Lyndon Allin, Adviser

Ville Brummer, Director, Programme

Natalia Djandjava, Project Officer

Oskari Eronen, Senior Manager, Programme Management Office

Silja Grundström, Adviser

Eemeli Isoaho, Programme Management Officer

Elina Lehtinen, Head, Communications and Fundraising

Denis Matveev, Programme Adviser

Osecu, Project Manager

Mikko Patokallio, Analyst

Antonia Potter Prentice, Senior Manager, Gender, Inclusion and Mediation Support

Jaana Seppänen, Director, Finance and Administration

Vasilii Sova, Project Consultant

Jale Sultanli, Programme Manager

Elisa Tarnaala, Adviser, Gender

### **European Union Delegation**

Rosario De Blasio, High Level Advisor on Customs

Jarek Domanski, Programme Officer

Mindaugas Kacerauskis, Political Officer

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## **MOLDOVA**

Elena Bobkova, Core Group member

Tatiana Lariushin, Chisinau civil society, Core Group member

Victor Osipov, Chisinau civil society, Former Core Group member

Ruslan Slobodenyuk, Core Group member

## **OTHERS**

Mbaye Faye, Former Chief of Staff, Senegal Army, African Union

Yuri Ganin, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Core Group member, President

Lone Jessen, Gender Adviser , UN Department of Political Affairs

Tania Paffenholz, Professor, Geneva Graduate Institute for International Studies

Daniela Vidaicu, National Programme Coordinator, Swedish Embassy

Stephen Young, Deputy Head of Mission, Organization for Security and Coordination in Europe

Serge Neicovcen, Executive Director

Sergei Shrikov, Mediator and Director

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## ANNEX 4: DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

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# EVALUATION

PROGRAMME-BASED SUPPORT  
THROUGH FINNISH CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS I:  
CRISIS MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE  
2016



MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS OF FINLAND